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Security: thebestmensch/dot-me

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Threat model

dot-me defines a file format consumed by AI tools as authoritative user-context. The two attack classes that shape the v0.1 spec:

  1. Local file tamper: an attacker with filesystem access modifies identity.yaml / voice.md / preferences.yaml to inject persistent instructions into every future AI session.
  2. Exfiltration via prompt injection: a malicious project's CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, or similar instructs the agent to read and exfiltrate ~/.me/voice.md (or another file) to a third party.

The spec's primary mitigation for class (2) is the read-at-startup, not retrievable rule: consumers SHOULD load ~/.me/ files once at session start and MUST NOT expose them as tools the agent can re-read mid-session. Class (1) is mitigated by optional integrity tooling (.integrity hash baselines + signed git commits + a SessionStart drift check); these are not part of the format and consumers MUST work correctly whether or not they exist.

Full threat-model section: see personal-context-design.md §Appendix A.

Reporting a vulnerability

If you find a vulnerability in the spec itself (a loading pattern, schema convention, or hardening recommendation that creates exploitable behavior across consumer tools), email james@jamesmensch.com.

Please include:

  • The spec section or convention involved
  • The attack class (which threat above, or a new one)
  • A concrete consumer-tool scenario that exhibits the issue
  • Suggested mitigation if you have one

I'll acknowledge within 7 days. Coordinated disclosure preferred for issues that affect multiple consumer tools.

What's out of scope

  • Vulnerabilities in specific consumer tools that load dot-me files (Claude Code, future Claude Cowork plugin, third-party agents). Report those to the tool's vendor.
  • Vulnerabilities in a user's personal ~/.me/ content (e.g. weak GPG key, world-readable filesystem permissions). The spec recommends practices; enforcement is the user's responsibility.
  • Issues with the example content in this repo (the maintainer's identity.yaml etc.). These are illustrative, not normative.

Disclosure history

None yet. This file will be updated as findings land.

There aren't any published security advisories