中文版：SECURITY.zh.md

cmdseal is a macOS security tool whose entire value proposition is preventing secret material from leaking to AI coding agents, other processes on the same machine, and tampered copies of the sealed binary. Security reports are therefore treated as first-class issues.

Only the latest release line on main receives security fixes. Older snapshots pinned from git are out of scope; please upgrade before reporting.

Do not open a public GitHub issue for security problems.

Please report privately via either channel:

• Email: dev@szgenle.com — include a clear title prefixed with [cmdseal security].
• GitHub Security Advisories: use the Report a vulnerability button on the repository's Security tab (https://github.com/szgenle/cmdseal/security/advisories/new).

A useful report typically includes:

• cmdseal version / commit SHA, macOS version, Xcode CLT version.
• Minimal reproduction: the command template used to seal, the invocation that triggers the issue, and the observed vs. expected behaviour.
• Whether the issue leaks plaintext secrets, bypasses keychain ACL binding, bypasses DYLD_* stripping / hardened runtime, or allows substituting the underlying program.

Best-effort targets from a solo maintainer — not a contractual SLA:

If you have not heard back within a week, please re-send the report (email delivery failures happen).

In scope, broadly:

• Breaking the binding between a sealed runner's cdhash and its keychain-stored AES key (ACL bypass).
• Recovering secrets from a sealed binary without the corresponding keychain item (AEAD bypass, side channels).
• Injecting code into a sealed runner's address space before execv (e.g. via environment, DYLD_*, path substitution).
• Privilege escalation or persistence achieved by abusing cmdseal itself (CLI or GUI).

Out of scope:

• Attacks that require the attacker to already have code execution as the same user and interactive keychain-unlock rights — that is part of the documented threat model, see the Security model section of the README.
• Social-engineering the user into running an unrelated malicious binary.
• Issues in upstream dependencies (PySide6, Qt, CPython, macOS itself) — please report those to the respective projects.

We prefer coordinated disclosure. Please give us a reasonable window (typically 30–90 days depending on severity) before publishing details. Credit will be given in the release notes / CHANGELOG unless you request otherwise.