Ergon is an agent SDK plus a self-hostable Studio. This document covers how to
report a vulnerability and the security properties the collaboration tier is
built with. It is an engineering account, not a compliance certification — see
docs/soc2-controls.md for how these map to SOC 2 Trust Services criteria and
what is built versus a process the operator still owns.
Please do not open a public issue for a security report. Instead, report it privately through GitHub Security Advisories:
Report a vulnerability — github.com/shipitamit/ergon → Security tab → Report a vulnerability
This keeps the report confidential between you and the maintainers until a fix is released. Include a description, reproduction steps, and the impact you see.
We aim to acknowledge within a few business days and to coordinate a fix and a disclosure timeline with you.
- Authentication. Email + password (hashed with bcrypt, or a
node:cryptoscrypt fallback), httpOnly + SameSite session cookies, and optional SSO via OpenID Connect (authorization-code + PKCE, nonce, signed state). SSO accounts carry a non-verifiable sentinel password hash, so they cannot be signed into with a password. - Authorization. Access is org + RBAC only: every harness belongs to one organization, and a member's access is their org role (owner/admin → edit, member → view). Every harness, run, kv and org route enforces the role server-side.
- Programmatic access. Org-scoped API keys (service accounts): the secret is shown once and only its SHA-256 is stored; keys are confined to the harness / kv / run / gateway surface; revocation cuts access immediately.
- Audit. An append-only, per-org audit log records org, membership, harness, key, budget, and deployment changes, plus SSO sign-ins and data exports.
- Spend & abuse controls. Per-org budgets (spend caps / request quotas, enforced at run admission) and per-IP + per-org rate limiting (Redis-backed across instances when configured).
- Data governance. Per-org data export (portable JSON, secrets excluded) and owner-only right-to-erasure that deletes every org-scoped row and the service-account users its keys created.
- Secrets. Provider keys are read from the environment or an external secret
manager (AWS/GCP/Azure adapters); they are never returned to the client and
never written to the harness graph.
.ergon-settings.json/.keyare git-ignored. - Transport. Intended to run behind HTTPS so the session cookie is
Secure; setNODE_ENV=production.
This is an app scaffold, not a hardened multi-tenant SaaS. A production
deployment should add HTTPS termination, a reviewed secrets pipeline, CSRF
hardening if moving off SameSite=Lax, dependency and image scanning, and an
independent security review. The SOC 2 controls matrix marks which items are
built in code versus a process the operator must run.