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Security: osbytes/reelsaw

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Reelsaw is self-hosted software that takes uploads and links from its users, runs media tools on them and talks to model providers with keys the admin entered. Bugs in those paths matter to every instance, so please report them privately first.

Reporting a vulnerability

Use GitHub's private reporting: Security → Report a vulnerability on github.com/osbytes/reelsaw. It opens a private advisory only the maintainers can read. Do not open a public issue or discussion for anything that could be a vulnerability.

What helps: the version (reelsaw version, or Settings → System), how the instance is deployed (Compose install, GPU profile, behind which proxy), steps to reproduce, and what an attacker gains. A proof of concept against your own instance is welcome. Please do not test against instances you do not run.

You will get an acknowledgement within 7 days and a fix or a plan within 30. Fixes ship as a patch release with a changelog entry; the advisory is published once a release carries the fix. Credit goes to the reporter unless they ask otherwise.

Scope

In scope, with examples of what we consider serious:

  • Authentication and authorization: session or API-key bypass, one user reaching another user's projects, clips, library items or settings, non-admins reaching admin tools (web, tRPC, MCP, CLI).
  • The MCP server (/api/mcp, reelsaw mcp) and OAuth issuer.
  • Source handling: SSRF through link sources beyond what ALLOW_PRIVATE_SOURCE_URLS permits, path traversal in uploads, transcript imports or issue-report zips, command injection into ffmpeg or yt-dlp.
  • Secrets at rest: provider keys the admin entered, API keys, session material.
  • The published Docker image and the installer scripts (deploy/).

Out of scope: denial of service from large media on an instance without the documented limits (MAX_UPLOAD_MB, MAX_SOURCE_FILE_MB, quotas), findings that need a compromised admin account or host, vulnerabilities in model providers or in Ollama itself, and reports from automated scanners without a reproduction.

Supported versions

Reelsaw is pre-1.0. Fixes land on main and ship in the next release; only the latest release is supported. Instances should follow the update check (Settings → System) or watch releases.

Hardening an instance

  • Set SIGNUP_MODE=closed or approval after creating the first account.
  • Keep BETTER_AUTH_SECRET long and private; rotating it invalidates sessions and the provider keys stored in Settings.
  • Leave ALLOW_PRIVATE_SOURCE_URLS off unless the instance must read from a NAS.
  • Put the instance behind an HTTPS reverse proxy and keep TRUST_PROXY matched to the deployment (false when the app is exposed directly). Set TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS to the number of proxies in front of the app (2 for Cloudflare in front of Caddy) so the client address is the entry from the right that your proxies wrote, not one the client sent; use TRUSTED_PROXY_HEADER=cf-connecting-ip only when the origin accepts traffic from Cloudflare alone.
  • Create API keys without "Allow instance administration" unless the agent must change instance settings. OAuth connectors never get admin tools. Connected apps can be revoked under Settings → Account.

URL sources and your network

Reelsaw checks the address of every link it fetches itself (library imports, subtitle files): the name is resolved once, refused if it is inside the network, and the connection goes to that address, so DNS rebinding and redirects to internal hosts are caught. yt-dlp, which downloads the video behind a project's source link, resolves names and follows redirects and embedded URLs on its own; Reelsaw only checks the first address. A hosted or shared instance, where people you do not trust can add links, should not rely on that check alone:

  • Send yt-dlp's traffic through an egress proxy that refuses private destinations (YTDLP_PROXY, for example an HTTP proxy or gateway on a separate network), or
  • run the app container under a network policy or firewall rule that blocks RFC1918 ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16), link-local (169.254.0.0/16, which includes cloud metadata at 169.254.169.254) and fc00::/7, fe80::/10, except for the services it needs (database, object storage, Ollama).

A single-user instance on a home network that reads from its own NAS has less to defend; that is what ALLOW_PRIVATE_SOURCE_URLS=true is for.

Dependencies are watched by Dependabot and CodeQL on every pull request.

There aren't any published security advisories