fix(plugin-security)!: the delegation probes, field projections, explanation and narrowing diagnostic answer the prologue's organization-membership refusal

.changeset/25107-delegation-probes-organization-membership.md

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/plugin-security': patch
+---
+
+fix(plugin-security)!: the delegation probes, field projections, explanation and narrowing diagnostic answer the refusal the operation prologue makes for a delegated context whose delegator is not a member of the organization it runs in, on a walled posture
+
+Clause-②: no (narrowing)
+Metadata-protocol: none
+
+<!-- adr-0087: not-required (runtime-interface-only packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/explain-engine.ts#ExplainEngineDeps) No metadata moves: no spec key, authorable spelling, object definition or stored shape is added, removed, renamed or re-shaped, so there is nothing for `objectstack migrate meta` to rewrite. Two things change. The security service's probes answer an in-process caller that builds an on-behalf-of execution context in an organization the delegator does not belong to with the refusal its operations already get; the remedy is to build that context in an organization the delegator is a member of, never a rewrite of a package source or a stored row. And the published runtime interface `ExplainEngineDeps`, which has no metadata surface, gains a required member; the channel that reaches an embedder who builds it is the compiler at their own call site. -->
+
+**BREAKING** (the security service's answers narrow for one context shape, and `ExplainEngineDeps` gains a required member). Under `isolated` or `group`, the delegated-principal prologue refuses every operation of an on-behalf-of context whose active organization the delegator's own membership does not back (ADR-0090 D10, `vetOrganizationClaim`), and the raw-SQL read scope answers that refusal too. The other readers in this package that resolve a delegator on their own did not ask that question, so for the same context they answered an admission the operation refuses. Each now asks it at the prologue's point, through one helper (`delegatedOrganizationRefusal`) that the prologue and the read scope ask as well.
+
+- **FROM:** under `isolated` or `group`, for an execution context carrying `onBehalfOf` and an active organization the delegator is not a member of, `canReadObject`, `canWriteObject` and `canExport` could answer `true`; `getReadableFields`, `getMetadataReadableFields`, `getWritableFields` and `getQueryableFields` answered the intersected field list; the access explanation reported the D10 intersection and could answer `allowed: true`; `describeDelegationNarrowing` could report a narrowing; and the explanation's per-record write gate asked the sharing service as the agent and the delegator.
+- **TO:** the three probes answer `false`; the four field projections answer `[]`; the explanation answers `allowed: false`, its principal and object_crud layers `denies`, naming the organization the delegator is not a member of; `describeDelegationNarrowing` answers `{ narrowed: false }`, as for a dangling delegator; and the per-record write gate refuses without asking the sharing service.
+- **Unchanged:** the `single` posture, an on-behalf-of context with no active organization, an on-behalf-of context in an organization the delegator is a member of, a context without `onBehalfOf`, a dangling delegator, and system contexts. The `/mcp` OAuth door, the one producer of an on-behalf-of context in the platform, vets the request's organization against the same membership, so the contexts it builds keep every answer.
+- **The fix for an in-process producer:** code that builds an `ExecutionContext` with `onBehalfOf` by hand must set its `tenantId` to an organization the delegating user is a member of, or leave it unset.
+- **`ExplainEngineDeps`:** an embedder that builds the explain engine's dependencies itself passes the deployment's tenancy posture as `tenancyPosture`, the value the security plugin's enforcement runs under. The compiler names the missing member.

content/docs/permissions/system-context.mdx

@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ that silently does not happen.
 | 4 | Field-level security returns **all** fields | plugin-security | Get: every column readable (`getReadableFields`) and writable (`getWritableFields`). Lose: field masking | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts#resolveProjectionFieldMask` |
 | 5 | Export permission granted unconditionally | plugin-security | Get: `canExport` is `true` | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts#canExport` |
 | 6 | Object-level read admission granted unconditionally | plugin-security | Get: `canReadObject` is `true`. This is the OBJECT-level half of a read — "may this caller read this object at all" — which the doors that bypass this middleware ask before they compile a statement of their own; `getReadFilter` is its row-level half, and the two are not interchangeable | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts#canReadObject` |
-| 6b | WRITE admission granted unconditionally | plugin-security | Get: `canWriteObject` is `true`. The WRITE twin of the object-level read admission above, asked by the write PREVIEW (`ObjectQL.validate()`), which runs no middleware for its target object and so has no gate of its own. It exists because a validation rule that reads one hop through a reference field is evaluated against a related row fetched under system authority, and that elevation is bounded to the arms the question RUNS — named, ⛔ never a category of the write decision, and ⛔ not a promise the write would succeed. The arms: the ADR-0103 engine-owned affordance gate and the ADR-0090 D12 delegated-admin gate (both ahead of every resolution), the fail-closed postures (#3545's unresolvable posture and the D10 dangling delegator), the ADR-0066 D3 capability arm, the CRUD grant, the ADR-0090 D10 delegator arm that a bare CRUD-grant check misses, the field-level-security write gate over the caller's payload when one is supplied, and the ADR-0123 D2 no-active-organization wall | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts#canWriteObject` |
+| 6b | WRITE admission granted unconditionally | plugin-security | Get: `canWriteObject` is `true`. The WRITE twin of the object-level read admission above, asked by the write PREVIEW (`ObjectQL.validate()`), which runs no middleware for its target object and so has no gate of its own. It exists because a validation rule that reads one hop through a reference field is evaluated against a related row fetched under system authority, and that elevation is bounded to the arms the question RUNS — named, ⛔ never a category of the write decision, and ⛔ not a promise the write would succeed. The arms: the ADR-0103 engine-owned affordance gate and the ADR-0090 D12 delegated-admin gate (both ahead of every resolution), the fail-closed postures (#3545's unresolvable posture, the D10 dangling delegator and, on a walled posture, the D10 delegator who is not a member of the organization the request runs in), the ADR-0066 D3 capability arm, the CRUD grant, the ADR-0090 D10 delegator arm that a bare CRUD-grant check misses, the field-level-security write gate over the caller's payload when one is supplied, and the ADR-0123 D2 no-active-organization wall | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts#canWriteObject` |
 | 6c | The tenant wall's per-row verdict for the write PREVIEW answers **"not asked"** | plugin-security | Get: `writeWallVerdict` returns `null`, so `ObjectQL.validate()` treats the rows exactly as it does with no verdict registered: no row is refused by the Layer 0 tenant wall, and the elevated preview's `readonly` strips stay skipped as they always were. That is what the elevated write does: the whole security middleware short-circuits before step 3.7, so the wall never judges an elevated row's organization. Lose: nothing the write enforces. The verdict exists so a preview answers a row's organization as its write answers it (#25062), and an elevated write meets no tenant wall to answer for | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts#writeWallVerdict` |
 | 7 | Write bypass = `true`, effective write scope = `org` | plugin-security | Get: widest write scope without holding any capability | `packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/security-plugin.ts#start` |
 | 8 | Metadata-plane schema masking exempt (ADR-0106 D4) | metadata-core | Get: unmasked object schema. Note: the exemption is a **caller** property — it short-circuits before the security service is consulted | `packages/metadata-core/src/object-schema-fls.ts#isObjectSchemaMaskExempt` |