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Security: noxgle/one

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

Version Supported
0.1.x ✅
< 0.1 ❌

We actively support the latest 0.1.x release. Security fixes are backported when feasible.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report security vulnerabilities privately via GitHub Security Advisories. If advisories are unavailable (e.g. in a fork), email s.wielgosz@noxgle.com with "[SECURITY] " in the subject. Do not open a public issue for security-sensitive bugs.

Include:

  • A description of the vulnerability and its impact.
  • Steps to reproduce (code, commands, or configuration).
  • Your assessment of severity (if any).

We aim to acknowledge reports within 48 hours and provide a fix or mitigation plan within 30 days for confirmed vulnerabilities.

What this project handles

Sensitive local state

  • auth.json — API keys and OAuth tokens; written with mode 0600 on POSIX.
  • settings.json / models.json — configuration; written atomically.
  • Session JSONL files (sessions/*.jsonl) — conversation history; written atomically.
  • ONE_CODING_AGENT_DIR can override the default ~/.config/one.

Text configuration files and session JSONL are written through atomic tempfile + os.replace to prevent truncation on interruption, and new directories are created with mode 0700. The blob store for image attachments uses its own dedicated 0600/0700 handling (content-addressed blobs with exclusive temp files and fsync).

Code execution boundaries

  • Project extensions (.one/extensions/*.py) are imported and executed at session startup. They run with the same permissions as one — not sandboxed.
  • MCP server commands (from .one/settings.json) are spawned as child processes. They run with the same permissions as one — not sandboxed.
  • Bash tool executes shell commands in the project working directory.
  • File tools (read/write/edit/grep/find/ls) operate on the filesystem.
  • Cooperation mode is an approval gate only, not a sandbox. Tools still execute with full permissions.

Native HTTP retrieval

web_connect is a GET-only capability available in Default and Readonly, not a network sandbox or SSRF filter. Readonly limits app-mediated file/shell actions, not this tool's network reachability. It intentionally permits localhost, private addresses and infrastructure metadata endpoints accessible to the ONE process. GET can have side effects. Do not enable it for sessions that must not access the network; use process/container/network isolation for enforcement outside the application. Exclude it with an explicit tool allowlist when network retrieval is not wanted.

Requests use a dedicated client without provider credentials or environment proxies, with TLS verification, validated redirects and bounded transfer/output. Response cookies are cleared between redirect hops. Only HTTP(S) URLs without userinfo are accepted. Tool metadata and runtime argument diagnostics redact queries and credentials; arbitrary secrets embedded in documents, URL paths, original user/model messages, or raw source cannot be automatically identified. Full permitted content may be retained in private evidence sidecars and passed to the model through evidence_read. All retrieved content remains untrusted; HTML parsing does not execute scripts or fetch subresources. These protections do not guarantee model resistance to every prompt injection.

Provider data transmission

Provider API keys and OAuth tokens are sent to the respective provider endpoints over HTTPS. one does not proxy or log this traffic. Token redaction is applied to error messages and RPC responses.

OAuth / subscription login

  • Anthropic and ChatGPT/Codex subscription logins are supported production features, but they use reverse-engineered OAuth flows. These endpoints are not part of any public API and are externally controlled by the respective providers.
  • They may change without notice. Third-party use of subscription credentials against these backends is at the user's own risk and may violate the provider's Terms of Service.
  • Tokens are stored in auth.json and automatically refreshed before expiry.

Environment variables

API keys can be supplied via environment variables (OPENAI_API_KEY, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, etc.) as an alternative to auth.json. Environment variables take precedence over stored keys but are not persisted.

Recommendations

  1. Only run one in trusted repositories. Use one --no-extensions --no-mcp for untrusted code.
  2. Keep auth.json private. Verify file permissions (stat auth.json should show 600).
  3. Use ONE_CODING_AGENT_DIR to isolate session data when testing.
  4. Pin dependencies in production environments.
  5. Review extensions before loading untrusted custom packages.

If you need to contact maintainers without using advisories, email s.wielgosz@noxgle.com with "[SECURITY] " in the subject.

There aren't any published security advisories