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Segmented a flat home network into three isolated VLANs (Main, IoT, Guest) using a TP-Link Omada stack (ER605 / SG2008P / EAP650). Configured per-VLAN DHCP scopes, mapped SSIDs to VLANs, and built a stateful gateway ACL trust model that contains low-trust IoT and guest devices while keeping trusted devices reachable.

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Home Network Segmentation — TP-Link Omada Lab

A self-directed home lab in which I took my flat home network and rebuilt it into a segmented design: three isolated VLANs (Main, IoT, Guest), per-VLAN Wi-Fi networks, and a gateway ACL trust model — all managed from a TP-Link Omada Software Controller and documented with the reasoning behind each decision.

This is a self-directed learning project on my own home network, not production experience. I built it to get hands-on with the networking fundamentals (VLANs, routing, ACLs, stateful firewalling) that sit underneath IT support / MSP work.


Why this lab exists

Most home networks — and plenty of small-business ones — are a single flat /24 where a $10 smart plug sits in the same broadcast domain as the laptop used for banking. That's exactly the kind of setup an MSP walks into and has to fix.

I wanted to do that fix myself, end to end, on real hardware: design the subnets, map wireless networks onto them, write the firewall rules, and then deal with the side effects (like device discovery breaking across VLANs). The goal was a network that's actually more secure and still pleasant to live with — with the trade-offs written down, not just the clicks.


Environment / architecture

Component Detail
Management TP-Link Omada Software Controller (v6.2.x), self-hosted on Windows
Gateway 1 × TP-Link Omada ER605 — routes between VLANs, enforces ACLs, serves DHCP
Switching 1 × TP-Link TL-SG2008P — 8-port Gigabit smart managed switch (4 × PoE+), trunks tagged VLANs to the APs and powers them over PoE+
Wireless 2 × TP-Link Omada EAP650 — Wi-Fi 6 (AX3000) ceiling APs (Basement, Main Floor), PoE+ powered from the switch, one SSID per VLAN, seamless roaming
VLANs Main (1), IoT (20), Guest (30)
Starting point Flat 192.168.0.0/24, everything in one broadcast domain

Logical layout

Internet
   │
ER605 Gateway ── routes between VLANs · Gateway ACLs · DHCP per VLAN
   │
TL-SG2008P Switch ── 802.1Q trunk (VLANs 1, 20, 30 tagged)
   │
   ├── EAP650 (Basement)   ─┐
   ├── EAP650 (Main Floor) ─┴── RedLeader       → VLAN 1   192.168.0.0/24   (trusted)
   │                            RedLeader_IoT   → VLAN 20  192.168.20.0/24  (contained)
   │                            RedLeader_Guest → VLAN 30  192.168.30.0/24  (contained, client isolation)
   └── Omada Controller host

Live topology from the Omada Controller

Omada topology: WAN to ER605 gateway to TL-SG2008P switch, which feeds the Basement AP (13 clients), Main Floor AP (35 clients), the Omada Controller host and two wired clients

All links at 1 Gbps full duplex. The two EAP650s are serving 13 and 35 wireless clients across the three SSIDs. Device MAC addresses and personal device names removed.

Trust matrix (end result)

From ↓ / To → Main IoT Guest Internet
Main ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
IoT ✘ ✔ ✘ ✔
Guest ✘ ✘ ✔ ✔

Main can reach into the other networks; IoT and Guest can only reach the internet and themselves. Four deny rules plus a stateful firewall produce this — see Phase 3 for why no "allow" rules were needed.

Validated with baseline-and-blocked tests in Phase 5 — which also surfaced a real gap: IoT devices could load the gateway's admin login page, because inter-VLAN rules don't cover traffic addressed to the gateway itself. Found, explained, and fixed with a fifth rule — whose first version then broke DNS for a real IoT device (a 3D printer). That regression was diagnosed and the rule narrowed until both checks passed: admin page blocked, normal traffic flowing.


Skills demonstrated

  • VLAN design — splitting one broadcast domain into purpose-based subnets with 802.1Q tagging
  • IP addressing & DHCP — per-VLAN scopes, with a reserved range kept free for static assignments
  • Wireless configuration — binding SSIDs to VLANs, band selection trade-offs, guest client isolation
  • Trunking — tagged vs. untagged traffic; APs carrying multiple VLANs over a single uplink
  • Firewall / ACL logic — top-down, first-match evaluation; designed around Omada's implicit allow (vs. the implicit deny used by Cisco ACLs)
  • Stateful firewalling — using return-traffic behaviour to build one-way trust with deny rules only
  • Service discovery — mDNS/Bonjour vs. SSDP/DIAL, and why multicast discovery doesn't cross VLANs
  • Design trade-offs — weighing security gain against day-to-day usability (the Roku decision)

Build log (by phase)

Each phase links to a detailed write-up with the reasoning, the exact settings, and verification steps.

Phase What was built Doc
1 VLAN & subnet design — Main, IoT, Guest 01-vlan-design.md
2 Wireless — SSID-to-VLAN mapping across both APs 02-wireless-ssids.md
3 Gateway ACL trust model 03-gateway-acls.md
4 mDNS discovery across VLANs & the Roku placement decision 04-mdns-and-discovery.md
5 Validation — proving the isolation actually works 05-validation.md

Key design decisions

  • Segment the noisy, low-trust devices; keep actively-controlled devices trusted. Bulbs, plugs and sensors go on IoT. A streaming box that's driven from a phone all day stays on Main.
  • Deny-only ACLs. Omada's gateway ACL ends in an implicit allow, and the firewall is stateful — so four deny rules are enough to get one-way trust from Main into IoT/Guest.
  • Both bands on IoT. IoT SSIDs are often 2.4 GHz-only, but the TV streams over Wi-Fi and needs 5 GHz throughput.

What I'd build next

  • Switch ACLs / port-level VLAN assignment for wired IoT devices
  • A dedicated Lab VLAN for the Active Directory home lab so domain traffic is isolated from the household network
  • DNS filtering (e.g. Pi-hole or gateway DNS filtering) per VLAN
  • A management VLAN for the controller, switch and APs
  • A NAS / storage project — planned as a separate build

Built and documented by Matthew as part of an IT support / MSP career transition.

About

Segmented a flat home network into three isolated VLANs (Main, IoT, Guest) using a TP-Link Omada stack (ER605 / SG2008P / EAP650). Configured per-VLAN DHCP scopes, mapped SSIDs to VLANs, and built a stateful gateway ACL trust model that contains low-trust IoT and guest devices while keeping trusted devices reachable.

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