A self-directed home lab in which I took my flat home network and rebuilt it into a segmented design: three isolated VLANs (Main, IoT, Guest), per-VLAN Wi-Fi networks, and a gateway ACL trust model — all managed from a TP-Link Omada Software Controller and documented with the reasoning behind each decision.
This is a self-directed learning project on my own home network, not production experience. I built it to get hands-on with the networking fundamentals (VLANs, routing, ACLs, stateful firewalling) that sit underneath IT support / MSP work.
Most home networks — and plenty of small-business ones — are a single flat /24 where a $10
smart plug sits in the same broadcast domain as the laptop used for banking. That's exactly the
kind of setup an MSP walks into and has to fix.
I wanted to do that fix myself, end to end, on real hardware: design the subnets, map wireless networks onto them, write the firewall rules, and then deal with the side effects (like device discovery breaking across VLANs). The goal was a network that's actually more secure and still pleasant to live with — with the trade-offs written down, not just the clicks.
| Component | Detail |
|---|---|
| Management | TP-Link Omada Software Controller (v6.2.x), self-hosted on Windows |
| Gateway | 1 × TP-Link Omada ER605 — routes between VLANs, enforces ACLs, serves DHCP |
| Switching | 1 × TP-Link TL-SG2008P — 8-port Gigabit smart managed switch (4 × PoE+), trunks tagged VLANs to the APs and powers them over PoE+ |
| Wireless | 2 × TP-Link Omada EAP650 — Wi-Fi 6 (AX3000) ceiling APs (Basement, Main Floor), PoE+ powered from the switch, one SSID per VLAN, seamless roaming |
| VLANs | Main (1), IoT (20), Guest (30) |
| Starting point | Flat 192.168.0.0/24, everything in one broadcast domain |
Logical layout
Internet
│
ER605 Gateway ── routes between VLANs · Gateway ACLs · DHCP per VLAN
│
TL-SG2008P Switch ── 802.1Q trunk (VLANs 1, 20, 30 tagged)
│
├── EAP650 (Basement) ─┐
├── EAP650 (Main Floor) ─┴── RedLeader → VLAN 1 192.168.0.0/24 (trusted)
│ RedLeader_IoT → VLAN 20 192.168.20.0/24 (contained)
│ RedLeader_Guest → VLAN 30 192.168.30.0/24 (contained, client isolation)
└── Omada Controller host
Live topology from the Omada Controller
All links at 1 Gbps full duplex. The two EAP650s are serving 13 and 35 wireless clients across the three SSIDs. Device MAC addresses and personal device names removed.
| From ↓ / To → | Main | IoT | Guest | Internet |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Main | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ | ✔ |
| IoT | ✘ | ✔ | ✘ | ✔ |
| Guest | ✘ | ✘ | ✔ | ✔ |
Main can reach into the other networks; IoT and Guest can only reach the internet and themselves. Four deny rules plus a stateful firewall produce this — see Phase 3 for why no "allow" rules were needed.
Validated with baseline-and-blocked tests in Phase 5 — which also surfaced a real gap: IoT devices could load the gateway's admin login page, because inter-VLAN rules don't cover traffic addressed to the gateway itself. Found, explained, and fixed with a fifth rule — whose first version then broke DNS for a real IoT device (a 3D printer). That regression was diagnosed and the rule narrowed until both checks passed: admin page blocked, normal traffic flowing.
- VLAN design — splitting one broadcast domain into purpose-based subnets with 802.1Q tagging
- IP addressing & DHCP — per-VLAN scopes, with a reserved range kept free for static assignments
- Wireless configuration — binding SSIDs to VLANs, band selection trade-offs, guest client isolation
- Trunking — tagged vs. untagged traffic; APs carrying multiple VLANs over a single uplink
- Firewall / ACL logic — top-down, first-match evaluation; designed around Omada's implicit allow (vs. the implicit deny used by Cisco ACLs)
- Stateful firewalling — using return-traffic behaviour to build one-way trust with deny rules only
- Service discovery — mDNS/Bonjour vs. SSDP/DIAL, and why multicast discovery doesn't cross VLANs
- Design trade-offs — weighing security gain against day-to-day usability (the Roku decision)
Each phase links to a detailed write-up with the reasoning, the exact settings, and verification steps.
| Phase | What was built | Doc |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | VLAN & subnet design — Main, IoT, Guest | 01-vlan-design.md |
| 2 | Wireless — SSID-to-VLAN mapping across both APs | 02-wireless-ssids.md |
| 3 | Gateway ACL trust model | 03-gateway-acls.md |
| 4 | mDNS discovery across VLANs & the Roku placement decision | 04-mdns-and-discovery.md |
| 5 | Validation — proving the isolation actually works | 05-validation.md |
- Segment the noisy, low-trust devices; keep actively-controlled devices trusted. Bulbs, plugs and sensors go on IoT. A streaming box that's driven from a phone all day stays on Main.
- Deny-only ACLs. Omada's gateway ACL ends in an implicit allow, and the firewall is stateful — so four deny rules are enough to get one-way trust from Main into IoT/Guest.
- Both bands on IoT. IoT SSIDs are often 2.4 GHz-only, but the TV streams over Wi-Fi and needs 5 GHz throughput.
- Switch ACLs / port-level VLAN assignment for wired IoT devices
- A dedicated Lab VLAN for the Active Directory home lab so domain traffic is isolated from the household network
- DNS filtering (e.g. Pi-hole or gateway DNS filtering) per VLAN
- A management VLAN for the controller, switch and APs
- A NAS / storage project — planned as a separate build
Built and documented by Matthew as part of an IT support / MSP career transition.
