Only the latest release receives fixes. The version scheme is Major.Minor.MonthDate, carried by a
single <Version> property in Directory.Build.props.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
1.1.x |
yes |
< 1.1 |
no |
Report privately through GitHub: Security → Advisories → Report a vulnerability on this repository. Do not open a public issue for a security problem.
Please include the version (the admin About page reports it), how the server is exposed on your network, and the smallest set of steps that reproduces the problem. Expect an acknowledgement within a week. If the report is accepted, the fix ships in the next release and the advisory is published once it is available; if it is declined, you will get the reasoning.
The following are deliberate and documented, so a report about them will be closed as working as intended. They are listed here so the boundary is explicit.
- The server has no authentication. It is built for a trusted home LAN, and DLNA itself has no concept of a user. Anything that can reach the media port can browse and stream the library.
- The admin UI is unauthenticated for the same reason, and it can stop the server, rebuild the
index and delete the database. Exposing it beyond the LAN is only supported behind the reverse
proxy and password in
docker-compose.admin-remote.yml; seeDocker.usage.md. - Uploading is off by default and is the only path that writes into the media tree. It is read
once at startup, so enabling it needs a restart. Every upload is recorded in
logs/uploadSecurity.log. Thumbnails.DownloadFFmpegis off by default because it fetches and executes a third-party binary. Turning it on is a deliberate choice.
A report that one of these can be reached from outside the network it was configured for, or that a guard on one of them can be bypassed, is in scope and worth sending.