Bitbucket cloud integration tests - #1421
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…t-cloud-integration-tests # Conflicts: # integrationutils.go
…ation jobs Mirrors the pattern from jfrog#1408 (github/azure/gitlab): shared concurrency group between the test job and its cleanup job, max-parallel:1 across the OS matrix, a -run filter so the cleanup helper test doesn't also run inside the main job, and a stricter cleanup if-condition. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 2 included reviews per hour; 0 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughAdds Bitbucket Cloud integration tests, separate Git push authentication, Bitbucket Cloud result validation, a pinned ChangesBitbucket Cloud integration
Priority: ⬇️ Low Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to The new Bitbucket integration workflow may expose credentials to untrusted pull-request code unless its trigger and repository access policies enforce a trusted boundary. Resolve or explicitly accept this before merging. Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant GitHubActions
participant FrogbotTests
participant BitbucketCloud
GitHubActions->>FrogbotTests: run Bitbucket Cloud integration tests
FrogbotTests->>BitbucketCloud: authenticate and scan repository
BitbucketCloud-->>FrogbotTests: return pull request comments
FrogbotTests-->>GitHubActions: validate results and clean up artifacts
Suggested reviewers: 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 7.14% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 14 functions across 2 files. (1 skipped: 1 unsupported.)
✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Inline comments:
In @.github/workflows/test.yml:
- Line 452: Update the workflow job using pull_request_target and
github.event.pull_request.head.sha so PR-head code is never executed with
repository secrets. Check out and test a trusted repository revision, or remove
secrets from that PR-head execution path while preserving the workflow’s
intended test behavior.
In `@integrationutils.go`:
- Line 433: Update closePullRequest to use the Bitbucket Cloud
PullRequests.Decline operation instead of UpdatePullRequest with
vcsutils.Closed, propagate any decline error, and verify via
ListOpenPullRequests that the pull request is no longer open before reporting
cleanup success.
After applying the fix, consider running `coderabbit review --agent` for local
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Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
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- Create a new PR with the fixes
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.github/workflows/test.ymlbitbucket_cloud_test.gointegrationutils.go
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…on-tests # Conflicts: # go.sum
📗 Scan Summary
|
| bitbucket-cloud-integration: | ||
| name: Bitbucket Cloud Integration Tests | ||
| needs: Pretest | ||
| runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}-latest | ||
| strategy: | ||
| fail-fast: false | ||
| max-parallel: 1 | ||
| matrix: | ||
| os: [ ubuntu, windows, macos ] | ||
| concurrency: | ||
| group: bitbucket-cloud-integration-fixture | ||
| cancel-in-progress: false | ||
| env: | ||
| JFROG_CLI_LOG_LEVEL: "DEBUG" | ||
| steps: | ||
| - uses: actions/checkout@v7 | ||
| with: | ||
| ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} | ||
| allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true | ||
| persist-credentials: false | ||
|
|
||
| - uses: jfrog/boost@v0 | ||
| with: | ||
| accept_terms: yes | ||
|
|
||
| - name: Setup Go | ||
| uses: actions/setup-go@v5 | ||
| with: | ||
| go-version-file: 'go.mod' | ||
| cache: false | ||
| - name: Go Cache Build & Tests | ||
| uses: actions/cache@v4 | ||
| with: | ||
| path: | | ||
| ~/.cache/go-build | ||
| ~\AppData\Local\go-build | ||
| ~/Library/Caches/go-build | ||
| key: ${{ runner.os }}-go-${{ hashFiles('**/go.sum') }}-${{ hashFiles('**/*.go') }} | ||
| restore-keys: | | ||
| ${{ runner.os }}-go-${{ hashFiles('**/go.sum') }}- | ||
| ${{ runner.os }}-go- | ||
|
|
||
| - name: Run Tests | ||
| run: go test -tags integration -run 'TestBitbucketCloud_' bitbucket_cloud_test.go integrationutils.go commands.go -v -race -timeout 30m -cover | ||
| env: | ||
| JF_URL: ${{ secrets.PLATFORM_URL }} | ||
| JF_ACCESS_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PLATFORM_ADMIN_TOKEN }} | ||
| FROGBOT_V3_TESTS_BITBUCKET_CLOUD_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.FROGBOT_V3_TESTS_BITBUCKET_CLOUD_TOKEN }} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🔌 Services Vulnerability
Full description
Vulnerability Details
| Rule ID: | REQ.SW.GITHUB-ACTIONS.CODE-EXEC |
A GitHub workflow that runs on pull_request_target and checks out the pull request code may be vulnerable to GitHub Actions code injection. An attacker can open a pull request from a forked repository and include malicious code that executes within the workflow's context. Depending on the workflow's permissions and environment, the attacker's code may perform unauthorized or harmful actions.
An attacker may exploit the workflow to access sensitive data available in the workflow's environment, such as API keys or other secrets. Additionally, if the workflow has write permissions to the repository, the attacker may be able to modify the project by pushing malicious code.
If possible, avoid using workflows triggered by pull_request_target. If this trigger is required, do not check out the pull request's code. If checking out the code cannot be avoided, ensure that the workflow does not execute commands that run actions based on the pull request's contents (for example, npm install or cmake). Additionally, validate that the pull request was created by a trusted actor before running the workflow.
| bitbucket-cloud-integration: | ||
| name: Bitbucket Cloud Integration Tests | ||
| needs: Pretest | ||
| runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}-latest | ||
| strategy: | ||
| fail-fast: false | ||
| max-parallel: 1 | ||
| matrix: | ||
| os: [ ubuntu, windows, macos ] | ||
| concurrency: | ||
| group: bitbucket-cloud-integration-fixture | ||
| cancel-in-progress: false | ||
| env: | ||
| JFROG_CLI_LOG_LEVEL: "DEBUG" | ||
| steps: | ||
| - uses: actions/checkout@v7 | ||
| with: | ||
| ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} | ||
| allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true | ||
| persist-credentials: false | ||
|
|
||
| - uses: jfrog/boost@v0 | ||
| with: | ||
| accept_terms: yes | ||
|
|
||
| - name: Setup Go | ||
| uses: actions/setup-go@v5 | ||
| with: | ||
| go-version-file: 'go.mod' | ||
| cache: false | ||
| - name: Go Cache Build & Tests | ||
| uses: actions/cache@v4 | ||
| with: | ||
| path: | | ||
| ~/.cache/go-build | ||
| ~\AppData\Local\go-build | ||
| ~/Library/Caches/go-build | ||
| key: ${{ runner.os }}-go-${{ hashFiles('**/go.sum') }}-${{ hashFiles('**/*.go') }} | ||
| restore-keys: | | ||
| ${{ runner.os }}-go-${{ hashFiles('**/go.sum') }}- | ||
| ${{ runner.os }}-go- | ||
|
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||
| - name: Run Tests | ||
| run: go test -tags integration -run 'TestBitbucketCloud_' bitbucket_cloud_test.go integrationutils.go commands.go -v -race -timeout 30m -cover | ||
| env: | ||
| JF_URL: ${{ secrets.PLATFORM_URL }} | ||
| JF_ACCESS_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PLATFORM_ADMIN_TOKEN }} | ||
| FROGBOT_V3_TESTS_BITBUCKET_CLOUD_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.FROGBOT_V3_TESTS_BITBUCKET_CLOUD_TOKEN }} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🔌 Services Vulnerability
Full description
Vulnerability Details
| Rule ID: | REQ.SW.GITHUB-ACTIONS.CODE-EXEC |
A GitHub workflow that runs on pull_request_target and checks out the pull request code may be vulnerable to GitHub Actions code injection. An attacker can open a pull request from a forked repository and include malicious code that executes within the workflow's context. Depending on the workflow's permissions and environment, the attacker's code may perform unauthorized or harmful actions.
An attacker may exploit the workflow to access sensitive data available in the workflow's environment, such as API keys or other secrets. Additionally, if the workflow has write permissions to the repository, the attacker may be able to modify the project by pushing malicious code.
If possible, avoid using workflows triggered by pull_request_target. If this trigger is required, do not check out the pull request's code. If checking out the code cannot be avoided, ensure that the workflow does not execute commands that run actions based on the pull request's contents (for example, npm install or cmake). Additionally, validate that the pull request was created by a trusted actor before running the workflow.
| bitbucket-cloud-integration-cleanup: | ||
| name: Cleanup Bitbucket Cloud Integration Test Artifacts | ||
| needs: [ Pretest, bitbucket-cloud-integration ] | ||
| if: ${{ always() && !cancelled() && needs.Pretest.result != 'skipped' && needs.bitbucket-cloud-integration.result != 'skipped' }} | ||
| runs-on: ubuntu-latest | ||
| concurrency: | ||
| group: bitbucket-cloud-integration-fixture | ||
| cancel-in-progress: false | ||
| env: | ||
| JFROG_CLI_LOG_LEVEL: "DEBUG" | ||
| steps: | ||
| - uses: actions/checkout@v7 | ||
| with: | ||
| ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} | ||
| allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true | ||
| persist-credentials: false | ||
|
|
||
| - uses: jfrog/boost@v0 | ||
| with: | ||
| accept_terms: yes | ||
|
|
||
| - name: Setup Go | ||
| uses: actions/setup-go@v5 | ||
| with: | ||
| go-version-file: 'go.mod' | ||
| cache: false | ||
|
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||
| - name: Run Cleanup | ||
| run: go test -tags integration -run TestHelper_CleanupIntegrationTestsArtifactsBitbucketCloud bitbucket_cloud_test.go integrationutils.go commands.go -v | ||
| env: | ||
| JF_URL: ${{ secrets.PLATFORM_URL }} | ||
| JF_ACCESS_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PLATFORM_ADMIN_TOKEN }} | ||
| FROGBOT_V3_TESTS_BITBUCKET_CLOUD_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.FROGBOT_V3_TESTS_BITBUCKET_CLOUD_TOKEN }} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🔌 Services Vulnerability
Full description
Vulnerability Details
| Rule ID: | REQ.SW.GITHUB-ACTIONS.CODE-EXEC |
A GitHub workflow that runs on pull_request_target and checks out the pull request code may be vulnerable to GitHub Actions code injection. An attacker can open a pull request from a forked repository and include malicious code that executes within the workflow's context. Depending on the workflow's permissions and environment, the attacker's code may perform unauthorized or harmful actions.
An attacker may exploit the workflow to access sensitive data available in the workflow's environment, such as API keys or other secrets. Additionally, if the workflow has write permissions to the repository, the attacker may be able to modify the project by pushing malicious code.
If possible, avoid using workflows triggered by pull_request_target. If this trigger is required, do not check out the pull request's code. If checking out the code cannot be avoided, ensure that the workflow does not execute commands that run actions based on the pull request's contents (for example, npm install or cmake). Additionally, validate that the pull request was created by a trusted actor before running the workflow.
| bitbucket-cloud-integration-cleanup: | ||
| name: Cleanup Bitbucket Cloud Integration Test Artifacts | ||
| needs: [ Pretest, bitbucket-cloud-integration ] | ||
| if: ${{ always() && !cancelled() && needs.Pretest.result != 'skipped' && needs.bitbucket-cloud-integration.result != 'skipped' }} | ||
| runs-on: ubuntu-latest | ||
| concurrency: | ||
| group: bitbucket-cloud-integration-fixture | ||
| cancel-in-progress: false | ||
| env: | ||
| JFROG_CLI_LOG_LEVEL: "DEBUG" | ||
| steps: | ||
| - uses: actions/checkout@v7 | ||
| with: | ||
| ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }} | ||
| allow-unsafe-pr-checkout: true | ||
| persist-credentials: false | ||
|
|
||
| - uses: jfrog/boost@v0 | ||
| with: | ||
| accept_terms: yes | ||
|
|
||
| - name: Setup Go | ||
| uses: actions/setup-go@v5 | ||
| with: | ||
| go-version-file: 'go.mod' | ||
| cache: false | ||
|
|
||
| - name: Run Cleanup | ||
| run: go test -tags integration -run TestHelper_CleanupIntegrationTestsArtifactsBitbucketCloud bitbucket_cloud_test.go integrationutils.go commands.go -v | ||
| env: | ||
| JF_URL: ${{ secrets.PLATFORM_URL }} | ||
| JF_ACCESS_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PLATFORM_ADMIN_TOKEN }} | ||
| FROGBOT_V3_TESTS_BITBUCKET_CLOUD_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.FROGBOT_V3_TESTS_BITBUCKET_CLOUD_TOKEN }} |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🔌 Services Vulnerability
Full description
Vulnerability Details
| Rule ID: | REQ.SW.GITHUB-ACTIONS.CODE-EXEC |
A GitHub workflow that runs on pull_request_target and checks out the pull request code may be vulnerable to GitHub Actions code injection. An attacker can open a pull request from a forked repository and include malicious code that executes within the workflow's context. Depending on the workflow's permissions and environment, the attacker's code may perform unauthorized or harmful actions.
An attacker may exploit the workflow to access sensitive data available in the workflow's environment, such as API keys or other secrets. Additionally, if the workflow has write permissions to the repository, the attacker may be able to modify the project by pushing malicious code.
If possible, avoid using workflows triggered by pull_request_target. If this trigger is required, do not check out the pull request's code. If checking out the code cannot be avoided, ensure that the workflow does not execute commands that run actions based on the pull request's contents (for example, npm install or cmake). Additionally, validate that the pull request was created by a trusted actor before running the workflow.


depends on: jfrog/froggit-go#203
Summary by CodeRabbit