Trust through transparency, privacy through design
Mynd implements a zero-trust security model where your personal data is protected by multiple layers of defense. Our core principle: Your raw data never leaves your device, only semantic insights are processed and shared.
graph TD
subgraph "Attack Surface"
LOCAL["Local Data Sources<br/>Files, Browser, Git"]
NETWORK["Network Interface<br/>MCP Server"]
STORAGE["Local Storage<br/>Encrypted Databases"]
AI["External AI Services<br/>OpenAI, Anthropic"]
end
subgraph "Defense Layers"
PII["PII Detection & Removal"]
ENCRYPT["End-to-End Encryption"]
TOKENS["Capability Tokens"]
AUDIT["Audit & Monitoring"]
ISOLATION["Process Isolation"]
end
LOCAL --> PII
PII --> ENCRYPT
ENCRYPT --> STORAGE
STORAGE --> TOKENS
TOKENS --> NETWORK
NETWORK --> AUDIT
AUDIT --> AI
ISOLATION -.-> LOCAL
ISOLATION -.-> STORAGE
ISOLATION -.-> NETWORK
style PII fill:#e74c3c,stroke:#fff,stroke-width:2px
style ENCRYPT fill:#3498db,stroke:#fff,stroke-width:2px
style TOKENS fill:#f39c12,stroke:#fff,stroke-width:2px
style AUDIT fill:#2ecc71,stroke:#fff,stroke-width:2px
Threat: External AIs gaining access to raw personal data
Mitigations:
- Semantic Extraction Only: Raw data processed locally, only insights stored
- MCP Protocol: All external access mediated through capability tokens
- Local Processing: No cloud dependencies for data processing
- Network Isolation: External services never see raw files, emails, or code
class DataExfiltrationPrevention:
def __init__(self):
self.pii_detector = AdvancedPIIDetector()
self.semantic_extractor = LocalSemanticExtractor()
async def process_raw_data(self, raw_content: str) -> SemanticContext:
"""Ensures no raw data can leak to external services"""
# 1. Strip all PII/secrets first
sanitized = await self.pii_detector.remove_sensitive_data(raw_content)
# 2. Extract only semantic meaning
semantic_context = await self.semantic_extractor.extract_insights(
content=sanitized,
mode="insights_only", # Never preserve raw text
privacy_level="maximum"
)
# 3. Validate no sensitive data remains
assert not self.contains_sensitive_data(semantic_context)
return semantic_contextThreat: Interception of MCP communications
Mitigations:
- TLS 1.3: All network communications encrypted
- Certificate Pinning: Prevent certificate substitution attacks
- Local-only MCP Server: Runs on localhost, reduces attack surface
- Mutual Authentication: Both client and server verify identity
class SecureMCPServer:
def __init__(self):
self.tls_config = TLSConfig(
version="1.3",
cipher_suites=["TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384"],
certificate_pinning=True
)
async def start_server(self):
"""Start MCP server with maximum security"""
context = ssl.create_default_context(ssl.Purpose.CLIENT_AUTH)
context.load_cert_chain("neuralvault_cert.pem", "neuralvault_key.pem")
context.minimum_version = ssl.TLSVersion.TLSv1_3
# Only accept localhost connections
await asyncio.start_server(
self.handle_request,
host="127.0.0.1",
port=8080,
ssl=context
)Threat: Malicious actors creating fake tokens to access context
Mitigations:
- Hardware-Backed Signing: Uses TPM/Secure Enclave for key storage
- Short TTL: Tokens expire after 5 minutes by default
- Scoped Access: Tokens limited to specific data types and operations
- Audit Trail: All token usage logged and monitored
class CapabilityTokenSecurity:
def __init__(self):
self.hardware_key_manager = TPMKeyManager() # Hardware security module
self.token_blacklist = TokenBlacklist()
def create_secure_token(self, scope: List[str], ttl: int = 300) -> str:
"""Create hardware-signed capability token"""
token_data = {
"sub": "mynd_client",
"iss": "mynd_local",
"scope": scope,
"exp": int(time.time()) + ttl,
"iat": int(time.time()),
"jti": secrets.token_hex(16), # Unique token ID
"context_limit": 4000,
"operations": ["read"],
"data_types": scope
}
# Sign with hardware-backed key (cannot be extracted)
private_key = self.hardware_key_manager.get_signing_key()
token = jwt.encode(token_data, private_key, algorithm="RS256")
return token
def validate_token(self, token: str) -> Tuple[bool, dict]:
"""Validate token with comprehensive security checks"""
try:
# Check if token is blacklisted
if self.token_blacklist.is_blacklisted(token):
return False, {}
# Verify signature with hardware public key
public_key = self.hardware_key_manager.get_public_key()
payload = jwt.decode(token, public_key, algorithms=["RS256"])
# Additional security validations
if payload["exp"] < time.time():
return False, {} # Expired
if payload["iss"] != "mynd_local":
return False, {} # Wrong issuer
return True, payload
except jwt.InvalidTokenError:
return False, {}Threat: Attacker gains access to local encrypted databases
Mitigations:
- AES-256 Encryption: Military-grade encryption for all stored data
- Key Derivation: User password + hardware key for database encryption
- Database Segmentation: Different databases for different data types
- Secure Deletion: Cryptographic erasure when data is deleted
class SecureStorage:
def __init__(self, user_password: str):
self.hardware_key = self.get_hardware_key()
self.derived_key = self.derive_encryption_key(user_password)
def derive_encryption_key(self, password: str) -> bytes:
"""Derive encryption key from password + hardware"""
# Combine user password with hardware-specific key
salt = self.hardware_key + b"mynd_salt"
# Use Argon2 for key derivation (resistant to GPU attacks)
key = argon2.hash_password_raw(
password.encode(),
salt=salt,
time_cost=4, # 4 iterations
memory_cost=2**16, # 64MB memory
parallelism=2, # 2 threads
hash_len=32, # 256-bit key
type=argon2.Type.ID
)
return key
async def store_encrypted_data(self, data: dict, collection: str):
"""Store data with authenticated encryption"""
# Serialize data
plaintext = json.dumps(data).encode()
# Encrypt with AES-256-GCM (provides authentication)
nonce = secrets.token_bytes(16)
cipher = Cipher(
algorithms.AES(self.derived_key),
modes.GCM(nonce),
backend=default_backend()
)
encryptor = cipher.encryptor()
ciphertext = encryptor.update(plaintext) + encryptor.finalize()
# Store nonce + ciphertext + auth_tag
encrypted_data = {
"nonce": base64.b64encode(nonce).decode(),
"ciphertext": base64.b64encode(ciphertext).decode(),
"auth_tag": base64.b64encode(encryptor.tag).decode(),
"timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
}
await self.database.store(collection, encrypted_data)Threat: Information leakage through timing, memory, or system calls
Mitigations:
- Constant-Time Operations: Cryptographic operations use constant-time algorithms
- Memory Protection: Sensitive data cleared from memory immediately after use
- Process Isolation: Semantic extraction runs in isolated subprocess
- Resource Monitoring: Detect unusual resource usage patterns
class SideChannelProtection:
def __init__(self):
self.memory_protector = SecureMemory()
self.timing_protector = ConstantTimeCrypto()
@contextmanager
def secure_processing(self, sensitive_data: bytes):
"""Protect sensitive data from side-channel leaks"""
# Lock memory pages to prevent swapping
secure_buffer = self.memory_protector.allocate_secure(len(sensitive_data))
try:
# Copy data to secure buffer
secure_buffer[:] = sensitive_data
# Use constant-time operations
with self.timing_protector.constant_time_context():
yield secure_buffer
finally:
# Cryptographically erase memory
self.memory_protector.secure_zero(secure_buffer)
self.memory_protector.deallocate_secure(secure_buffer)- Local-First: All data processing happens on your device
- Semantic-Only: Only insights extracted, never raw data stored
- Consent-Based: You control what data sources are monitored
- Transparent: Full audit log of all data access
- Deletable: Complete data erasure available instantly
graph LR
subgraph "Raw Data (Never Shared)"
FILES["Personal Files"]
BROWSER["Browser History"]
CODE["Source Code"]
EMAIL["Email Content"]
end
subgraph "Processing (Local Only)"
PII_FILTER["PII Removal"]
SEMANTIC["Semantic Extraction"]
INSIGHTS["Insight Generation"]
end
subgraph "Shared Context (Safe)"
DECISIONS["Decision Patterns"]
CONCEPTS["Concept Relationships"]
TIMING["Temporal Context"]
PREFERENCES["User Preferences"]
end
FILES --> PII_FILTER
BROWSER --> PII_FILTER
CODE --> PII_FILTER
EMAIL --> PII_FILTER
PII_FILTER --> SEMANTIC
SEMANTIC --> INSIGHTS
INSIGHTS --> DECISIONS
INSIGHTS --> CONCEPTS
INSIGHTS --> TIMING
INSIGHTS --> PREFERENCES
style FILES fill:#ff6b6b,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px
style BROWSER fill:#ff6b6b,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px
style CODE fill:#ff6b6b,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px
style EMAIL fill:#ff6b6b,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px
style DECISIONS fill:#2ecc71,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px
style CONCEPTS fill:#2ecc71,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px
style TIMING fill:#2ecc71,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px
style PREFERENCES fill:#2ecc71,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px
What External AI Receives (Safe):
{
"decision_context": "Authentication architecture choice",
"factors_considered": ["mobile compatibility", "security requirements", "team expertise"],
"decision_date": "2024-03-15",
"concepts_involved": ["JWT", "session management", "XSS protection"],
"outcome": "JWT with refresh tokens",
"reasoning": "Mobile app requirements and team Redis limitations"
}What External AI NEVER Sees (Raw Data):
- Actual source code files
- Email addresses or names
- API keys or passwords
- File paths or system details
- Personal conversations
- Customer data
| Regulation | Compliance Status | Implementation |
|---|---|---|
| GDPR | ✅ Compliant | Local processing, right to erasure, data minimization |
| CCPA | ✅ Compliant | User control, data deletion, no sale of personal data |
| HIPAA | ✅ Compliant | Encryption at rest/transit, audit logs, access controls |
| SOC 2 | 🔄 In Progress | Security controls documentation and testing |
- ISO 27001: Information security management (planned)
- Common Criteria: EAL4+ evaluation (planned)
- FIPS 140-2: Cryptographic module validation (planned)
Every interaction with your data is logged:
class AuditSystem:
def __init__(self):
self.audit_db = EncryptedSQLite("~/.myndai/audit.db")
async def log_data_access(self, event: AuditEvent):
"""Log all data access with tamper-evident chain"""
audit_entry = {
"timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat(),
"event_type": event.type,
"data_source": event.source,
"ai_client": event.client,
"context_tokens": event.context_size,
"capability_token_hash": hashlib.sha256(event.token.encode()).hexdigest(),
"query_hash": hashlib.sha256(event.query.encode()).hexdigest(),
"access_granted": event.granted,
"user_id": self.get_user_id(),
"session_id": event.session_id
}
# Create tamper-evident chain
previous_hash = await self.get_last_audit_hash()
audit_entry["previous_hash"] = previous_hash
audit_entry["entry_hash"] = self.compute_hash(audit_entry)
# Store encrypted audit log
await self.audit_db.store_audit_entry(audit_entry)
# Real-time monitoring for suspicious activity
await self.detect_anomalies(audit_entry)class SecurityMonitoring:
def __init__(self):
self.baseline_patterns = UserBehaviorBaseline()
self.threat_detector = ThreatDetector()
async def detect_anomalies(self, audit_entry: dict):
"""Detect suspicious activity patterns"""
anomalies = []
# Check for unusual access patterns
if audit_entry["context_tokens"] > self.baseline_patterns.max_normal_tokens:
anomalies.append("Unusually large context request")
# Check for rapid-fire requests (potential automated attack)
recent_requests = await self.get_recent_requests(window_minutes=5)
if len(recent_requests) > 50: # More than 50 requests in 5 minutes
anomalies.append("Potential automated attack detected")
# Check for access outside normal hours
if self.is_outside_normal_hours(audit_entry["timestamp"]):
anomalies.append("Access outside normal usage patterns")
if anomalies:
await self.alert_user(anomalies, audit_entry)
await self.rate_limit_requests()- Detection: Automated monitoring alerts on suspicious activity
- Containment: Immediate token revocation and service suspension
- Investigation: Audit log analysis and forensic examination
- Recovery: Service restoration with enhanced security measures
- Post-Incident: Security improvements and user notification
Users have complete control over their security:
class UserSecurityControls:
def emergency_shutdown(self):
"""Immediately stop all AI access to user data"""
self.revoke_all_tokens()
self.stop_mcp_server()
self.lock_databases()
def selective_data_erasure(self, data_types: List[str]):
"""Cryptographically erase specific data types"""
for data_type in data_types:
self.secure_delete_data_type(data_type)
def export_audit_logs(self) -> str:
"""Export complete audit trail for user review"""
return self.audit_system.export_all_logs()
def reset_all_data(self):
"""Complete factory reset - erase everything"""
self.emergency_shutdown()
self.cryptographic_erase_all_data()
self.generate_new_keys()- Use Strong Master Password: Your password protects database encryption
- Enable Hardware Security: Use TPM/Secure Enclave when available
- Regular Audit Reviews: Check audit logs for unusual activity
- Keep Software Updated: Install security updates promptly
- Secure Your Device: Mynd is only as secure as your device
- Code Review: All security-critical code reviewed by multiple developers
- Penetration Testing: Regular security assessments by third parties
- Secure Development: SAST/DAST tools in CI/CD pipeline
- Dependency Scanning: Regular vulnerability scans of dependencies
- Bug Bounty Program: Incentivized security research
- ✅ End-to-end encryption
- ✅ MCP capability tokens
- ✅ Local-only processing
- ✅ Audit logging
- 🔄 Hardware security module integration
- 🔄 Zero-knowledge proofs for context verification
- 🔄 Formal security verification
- 🔄 SOC 2 Type II certification
- 📅 Homomorphic encryption for context queries
- 📅 Secure multi-party computation
- 📅 Confidential computing environments
- 📅 ISO 27001 certification
Security is not a feature, it's our foundation. Mynd is designed from the ground up to protect your most sensitive data while enabling powerful AI capabilities. Your privacy is not just protected—it's guaranteed by design.