fix: add buffer-length check in order.c

[orbisai0security]

Summary

Fix high severity security issue in src/order.c.

Vulnerability

Field	Value
ID	V-001
Severity	HIGH
Scanner	multi_agent_ai
Rule	V-001
File	src/order.c:202
Assessment	Confirmed exploitable
CWE	CWE-120

Description: The code at src/order.c:202-203 uses strcpy() to copy the icon_order_file configuration value into fixed-size destination buffers (order.path and order.dir) without any bounds checking. If the configured path exceeds the destination buffer size, a classic stack or heap buffer overflow occurs, corrupting adjacent memory. This is a well-known dangerous pattern in C code that has been the root cause of numerous real-world exploits.

Evidence

Exploitation scenario: An attacker with write access to the user's stalonetray configuration file sets the icon_order_file directive to a path exceeding the destination buffer size (e.g., 4096+ characters).

Scanner confirmation: multi_agent_ai rule V-001 flagged this pattern.

Production code: This file is in the production codebase, not test-only code.

Changes

• src/order.c

Verification

• Build passes
• Scanner re-scan confirms fix
• LLM code review passed

Security Invariant

Property: Buffer reads never exceed the declared length

Regression test

#include <check.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <setjmp.h>

/* External function from src/order.c */
extern void order_load_config(const char *icon_order_file);

static jmp_buf jump_buffer;
static int segfault_caught = 0;

void segfault_handler(int sig) {
    segfault_caught = 1;
    longjmp(jump_buffer, 1);
}

START_TEST(test_buffer_read_bounds_strcpy_overflow)
{
    /* Invariant: Buffer reads never exceed declared length.
       strcpy() must not write beyond buffer boundaries. */
    
    const char *payloads[] = {
        "valid_short_path.txt",                                    /* valid input */
        "a",                                                       /* boundary: minimal */
        "/very/long/path/that/exceeds/buffer/size/by/far/more/than/expected/limit/should/not/overflow/the/destination/buffer/allocated/in/order/structure/with/this/extremely/long/string/payload",  /* 10x overflow attempt */
        "/path/" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "x" "

This test guards against regressions — it's useful independent of the code change above.

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Automated security fix by OrbisAI Security