Photo2Mac reads, edits and writes image files including embedded XMP metadata. If you find a vulnerability — anything that lets a crafted image execute code, corrupt user files outside the chosen output path, leak data through XMP, or break the non-destructive save round-trip in a way that loses pixels — please do not open a public issue.

Instead, email me directly:

razvan@cremenescu.ro

Use the subject line [Photo2Mac security]. If you want to use PGP, ask in the first message and I'll send a key.

I'll acknowledge within a few days, work on a fix, and credit you in the release notes unless you prefer to stay anonymous.

In scope:

• The Photo2Mac app itself (Swift source under App/).
• The XMP read/write pipeline (CGImageMetadata + the custom p2m namespace).
• Save-in-place / Save As (NSFileVersion handling, autosave on disk under ~/Library/Application Support/Photo2Mac/).
• The bundled .dmg (anything exploitable via the install flow).

Out of scope:

• The fact that ad-hoc signing triggers a Gatekeeper warning — that is intentional until I get an Apple Developer ID.
• Social-engineering or local-attack scenarios that already assume the attacker has full access to the machine.
• Upstream issues in Apple frameworks (ImageIO, Core Image) — please report those to Apple.

This is alpha software. Only the latest release receives fixes. Older tags are not patched.