ci: harden security-review.yml against script injection#3365
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Move untrusted github.event.* values (repository.name,
pull_request.number, pull_request.head.sha) into env: vars and
reference them as quoted shell variables instead of interpolating
${{ }} templates directly into run: blocks.
Same hardening applied in
aws@8afd2f6
which covered the other workflows but not security-review.yml.
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🔒 Security Review — View Report Please review before merging. |
Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## main #3365 +/- ##
=======================================
Coverage 78.20% 78.20%
=======================================
Files 695 695
Lines 124172 124172
Branches 17238 17239 +1
=======================================
+ Hits 97104 97106 +2
+ Misses 26147 26145 -2
Partials 921 921 ☔ View full report in Codecov by Harness. 🚀 New features to boost your workflow:
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geedo0
approved these changes
Jul 21, 2026
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Issues:
Addresses V2265233159
Description of changes:
Continuation of 8afd2f6, extending the same script-injection hardening to
security-review.yml.Directly interpolating
${{ github.event.* }}context expressions intorun:shell bodies lets Actions splice them in as text before the shell runs — a script-injection risk. This PR hoists each flagged value into the step'senv:block and references it as a quoted shell variable instead. Behavior is unchanged.Update commit status: hoistgithub.event.repository.name,github.event.pull_request.number, andgithub.event.pull_request.head.shaintoenv.Post review comment: hoistgithub.event.repository.nameandgithub.event.pull_request.numberintoenv.Call-outs:
pull_request_target, so hardening these interpolations matters even though the flagged fields (repo name, PR number, commit SHA) are format-constrained.${{ github.repository }}is left inline — it is notgithub.event.*attacker-influenced input.Testing:
CI-config-only, no product code impact. File parses as valid YAML; no
${{ github.event.* }}interpolations remain in anyrun:body.By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license and the ISC license.