A technical overview of TikTok's internal API security, covering the signature algorithms used to authenticate client-server communication. This repository provides Python implementations for both Mobile and Web signing pipelines, as well as the TTEncrypt layer.
Disclaimer: Interacting with private APIs without authorization may violate the terms of service of the platform. Proceed with caution and at your own risk.
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Mobile/ # Mobile signing pipeline (Android/TikTok app)
├── metasec.py # Main Metasec class — entry point for all mobile signatures
├── native.py # Bit manipulation utilities (rotate, reverse, byteswap…)
├── exception.py # Custom exceptions
├── cipher/
│ ├── AES.py # AES wrapper (OFB mode)
│ ├── RC4.py # RC4 stream cipher
│ └── SIMON.py # SIMON block cipher (128-bit, 72 rounds)
├── helpers/
│ ├── argus.py # X-Argus generation (protobuf + SM3 + SIMON + AES)
│ └── ladon.py # X-Ladon key derivation and encoding
└── protobuf/
└── protobuf.py # Custom protobuf serializer/reader
Web/ # Web signing pipeline (browser / tiktok.com)
├── bogus.py # X-Bogus signature (double-MD5 + RC4 + shifted base64)
├── gnarly.py # ChaCha20-based PRNG used for web entropy
├── compress.py # LZW compressor
├── base.py # Node.js-compatible base64 encode/decode
└── ressource.py # RC4 + execjs base64 helper (shifted alphabet)
TTEncrypt/
└── ttencrypt.py # TT payload encryption (AES + custom S-boxes + gzip)
The Metasec class (Mobile/metasec.py) is the single entry point for signing mobile API requests. It produces four headers in one call:
| Header | Description |
|---|---|
X-Argus |
Main mobile signature — protobuf → SM3 → SIMON → AES |
X-Gorgon |
Secondary integrity header derived from params + payload + cookies |
X-Ladon |
Lightweight token bound to app_id and license_id |
X-Khronos |
Current Unix timestamp |
from Mobile import Metasec
signer = Metasec() # Uses built-in default SIGN_KEY
# Or provide your own key:
# signer = Metasec(key="<base64-encoded-32-byte-key>")
headers = signer.sign(
url="https://api.tiktokv.com/aweme/v1/feed/?aid=1233&...",
app_id=1233,
app_version="25.1.1",
app_launch_time=1700000000,
device_type="SM-G973N",
sdk_version="v04.04.09-boa-hotfix",
sdk_version_code=44409,
license_id=123456,
device_id="1234567890123456789", # optional
device_token="...", # optional
dyn_seed="...", # optional (versions 1-8 supported)
dyn_version=1, # optional
payload=None, # hex string or None
cookies=None # raw cookie string or None
)
# headers = {"x-argus": "...", "x-gorgon": "...", "x-ladon": "...", "x-khronos": "..."}- Protobuf serialization — device/app/request metadata packed with the custom
ProtoBufencoder. - SM3 hashing — query string and body each hashed with the Chinese SM3 standard (similar to SHA-256).
- SIMON cipher — serialized protobuf encrypted with SIMON-128/256, 72 rounds.
- AES-OFB — SIMON output further encrypted with AES (key/IV derived from
SIGN_KEY). - Base64 output — prefixed with two control bytes, then standard base64-encoded.
dyn_version 1–8 are supported. Each version applies a different combination of MD5 hashing, byte reversal, XOR masks, and bit manipulation to produce the dyn field embedded in the protobuf.
Web/bogus.py (Signer class) signs browser-side requests appended as &X-Bogus=<value>.
Pipeline:
- Double-MD5 of URL params and request body.
- RC4-encrypt the User-Agent with key
[0,1,14], then base64 + MD5. - Assemble a salt array (timestamp, magic
536919696, hashes). - Filter → scramble → RC4-encrypt (key
[255]). - Prefix
\x02\xFF, encode with shifted base64 alphabetDkdpgh4ZKsQB80/Mfvw36XI1R25-WUAlEi7NLboqYTOPuzmFjJnryx9HVGcaStCe.
| File | Role |
|---|---|
gnarly.py |
ChaCha20-based PRNG seeded from timestamp + random values |
compress.py |
LZW compressor used to shrink payloads before signing |
base.py |
Node.js-compatible base64 (matches JS btoa byte-for-byte) |
ressource.py |
RC4 + execjs btoa + shifted-alphabet re-encode |
TTEncrypt/ttencrypt.py encrypts the raw request payload before it is sent. It uses:
- A custom AES-based cipher with four hardcoded S-box tables (
dword_0–dword_3). - gzip compression of the plaintext before encryption.
- A fixed magic header
[0x74, 0x63, 0x05, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00].
- IP Reputation — Residential IPs are treated with much less scrutiny than datacenter ranges.
- Device warm-up — A fresh
device_idmust be activated through a series of realistic requests before core endpoints return valid data. - Algorithm versioning — Constants and logic change with each app update; continuous RE is required to stay current.
- Geographic restrictions — Many endpoints behave differently or fail based on the client's IP region.