Report suspected vulnerabilities privately to info+pertry@adnoctem.co. Do not open a public issue with exploit details, credentials or private data before maintainers have had an opportunity to assess the report.

Useful reports include:

• The affected application and version (<app> version), the operating system, and whether it runs natively or under WSL.
• For sicht, the Ollama version and whether OLLAMA_HOST points at this machine; for bookscape, the configured classification provider.
• A minimal reproduction using synthetic data, the expected behaviour and the observed behaviour.
• The likely impact and the access required to trigger it.
• A contact address for follow-up and your disclosure or acknowledgement preferences.

Remove API keys, bookmark lists, image file names and unrelated personal information from examples and logs. A --log-level debug log names every file or URL it touches. If a credential has already been exposed, revoke or rotate it at the provider that issued it; deleting a file or log does not invalidate it.

Maintainers will assess the report, discuss reproduction or mitigation as needed, and coordinate a fix and public disclosure when appropriate. Please coordinate publication while the issue is being addressed. This project is maintained on a best-effort basis and does not promise a fixed response or remediation deadline.

If a problem originates in a dependency, Ollama, exiftool, Linkwarden or a model provider, report it to that project as well, and let pertry's maintainers know when a default or a documented setup is affected.

pertry is in pre-1.0 development. Fixes target the current development line and are published in a new release; earlier releases do not receive backports. Minor releases may contain breaking changes — read the release notes before upgrading.

Pin a release version for reproducible installs and update deliberately to receive fixes. releases/latest download URLs always move to the newest release.

Every release publishes CHECKSUMS_SHA256.txt covering its tarballs, served over HTTPS from GitHub. Verify a download against it before installing; the README shows how. Checksums detect corruption and tampering in transit; they do not authenticate the publisher independently of GitHub. Release tarballs are not signed.

The applications are personal tools that run on the machine holding the data, as the user who owns it. None runs a network listener, and none elevates privileges.

• sicht and file moves. sicht apply moves files within the workspace according to a plan. Targets are built from facet values, which a model can produce, so every path segment is sanitised and absolute paths, .. segments and drive letters are refused before any file moves. apply writes nothing without --execute, records every move in a manifest and never deletes a file.
• sicht and inference. sicht sends images only to the Ollama server at OLLAMA_HOST. sicht doctor warns when that host is not loopback, both because Ollama has no authentication on its model-management endpoints and because inference would no longer be local. Run Ollama bound to loopback unless it is deliberately shared.
• sicht and exiftool. sicht runs the exiftool found on PATH over every scanned file. Use a trusted installation; a crafted image is parsed by exiftool, not by sicht.
• formr and the Terraform engine. formr runs the terraform or tofu executable named by --engine, which in turn runs the module's provider plugins to read their schemas; plugins are programs, so this is not a sandbox. Use trusted engine and provider installations, verified by the module's lock file. formr never configures a provider, needs no credentials and reads no state, plan, variable files or secrets/; its reports contain no values from the module.
• bookscape and outbound requests. bookscape check sends requests to every bookmarked host, with TLS certificate verification always enabled. Those hosts and the network path learn which links are being checked. The model pass sends URLs, titles and folder paths to the configured provider; with classify.provider: ollama nothing leaves the machine.
• bookscape and Linkwarden. bookscape writes a file for import and does not connect to Linkwarden. Review an export before importing it, since an import cannot be undone in bulk.
• Planned web interface. sicht has no web interface yet. When it exists it is to bind to loopback only, validate the Host header, reject cross-origin state-changing requests and send a restrictive Content Security Policy; it will not use a session token, so those four controls are what protect it from web pages in the user's own browser.

• bookscape's provider API keys come from the environment or the configuration file and are never accepted as command-line flags. Protect the configuration file accordingly.
• sicht has no credentials. Its logs omit OCR text and stage payloads below debug level; debug logs stay in the workspace's .sicht/logs/.
• Both databases are unencrypted SQLite files holding personal data — a bookmark history or an image archive's metadata and model descriptions. Protect them like the source data.
• Secret scanning runs on every commit but does not guarantee that every sensitive value is detected.

Tests use synthetic fixtures. Integration tests that read a real archive take its path from SICHT_TEST_ARCHIVE and skip without it. The end-to-end suite starts a Linkwarden stack through the local Docker engine with credentials generated per run, and binds a local port; run it on a trusted machine. The scripts source code from LIBSH_DIR; use a trusted libsh installation of a pinned release.