fix: 4 security issues from code audit#334
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HIGH: handle_intro filter logic (AND→OR) — events with mismatched kind/type combos could slip through validation. MEDIUM: - Invite tokens: 3 bytes → 8 bytes (48-bit → 64-bit keyspace) - responder_health_set: add is_valid_slot_id() before path construction - Macaroon verify: constant-time sig comparison (prevent timing leak)
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…#334 follow-up) (#335) #334 fixed a HIGH boolean bug in the unauthenticated /v1/handle/intro filter (the `&&`-chain accepted a kind=1100 event of ANY type, and a wrong-kind event whose type happened to match) but added no test, so the exact bypass could silently come back. Lock it: - Extract the accept rule as a pure `intro_event_allowed(kind, type_str)` — `kind == 1100 && (type_str == "pair_drop" || type_str == "agent_card")` — and call it from the handler (no behavior change; just testable). - Regression test asserts the full accept/reject matrix, with the two #334 bypass classes called out explicitly: (a) kind=1100 + any other type rejected, (b) wrong-kind + matching type rejected. Pure refactor + test only; the live filter logic is byte-equivalent to #334's fix. 601 lib tests green, clippy clean. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Security fixes from code audit
Addresses 4 issues found during a security review of the wire codebase.
HIGH
relay_server.rs:1684) — Filter used&&instead of||, allowing events with mismatched kind/type combinations to pass validation. A kind=1100 event with anytypevalue, or a kind≠1100 event with type="pair_drop", would slip through. Changed to require both conditions.MEDIUM
relay_server.rs:1399) — Bumped from 3 random bytes (48-bit, ~16.7M keyspace, brute-forceable in hours at 1k req/s) to 8 bytes (64-bit, infeasible).relay_server.rs:2013) — Addedis_valid_slot_id()check before constructing file paths from theslot_idURL parameter. Bearer token check existed but defense-in-depth was missing.macaroon.rs:62) — Replaced!=with a constant-time byte comparison to prevent timing side-channels on signature verification.Testing
cargo check)Files changed
src/relay_server.rs— +14/-4src/macaroon.rs— +14/-1