Apex Control asks for sensitive permissions (Input Monitoring for the Reactive lighting effect) and writes to a device's memory, so security reports are taken seriously. This is a volunteer-run project: everything below is best effort, but a real report will get a real answer.
Only the latest release receives security fixes. While the project is at 0.x,
that means the newest 0.x release and master.
Please report it privately. Do not put the details in a public issue.
Use GitHub's private reporting form: https://github.com/Rikearon/apex-control/security/advisories/new (on the repository's Security tab, choose Report a vulnerability). You need a GitHub account. Only the maintainers and you can see what you submit.
If the form is ever unavailable, choose Contact a maintainer privately on the new issue page, put no details in it, and a maintainer will invite you to a private draft security advisory.
Helpful to include:
- what the problem is and where it is (a file, a command, a workflow);
- the version (
apexctl --version, or the app's version in Finder's Get Info), your macOS version and Mac architecture; - how to reproduce it, and what an attacker gains by doing so.
The aim is to acknowledge a report within about a week, assess it after that, and release a fix or mitigation as soon as it can be done responsibly. Reporters who want credit are named in the advisory and the changelog; say so if you would rather stay anonymous. Please allow time for a fix before disclosing publicly.
- The app,
apexctland the ApexKit library: for example a way to make them leak key presses, write to the keyboard something the user did not ask for, or execute code from a crafted profile file or command-line argument. - The build, signing and release scripts and workflows: for example a way to tamper with a release artefact, leak a secret, or run untrusted code in CI.
- The permission handling: anything that makes the app read input it should not.
- Vulnerabilities in the keyboard's firmware: report those to SteelSeries.
- Vulnerabilities in macOS, or in software the app does not ship.
- Attacks that need physical access to an unlocked Mac or to the keyboard.
- That the keyboard's control interface appears to have no authentication. macOS lets ordinary programs open it (which is why Apex Control needs no privileges), and as far as we found the keyboard obeys whatever it is sent, so a program running as you can reconfigure it with or without Apex Control. That is a property of the device and cannot be fixed here. What is in scope is Apex Control making it worse, for example by exposing the keyboard to other users or over a network.
- Damage caused by commands a user chose to send with
apexctl raw, which sends exactly the bytes you give it. - The fact that a locally created self-signed signing certificate is trusted on
your own Mac. That is what
Scripts/make-signing-identity.shis for; read the explanation first.
The privacy and security page has the detail and shows how to check each claim yourself. In short:
- No network access. The app's own code contains no networking, telemetry,
update check or account.
make checkfails if a networking API appears underSources/, and the privacy page shows how to check the built app. - Input Monitoring is used only for Reactive lighting. The key listener is listen-only and takes one thing from each press: the key's USB HID usage code, a single byte, to light that key. To tell whether macOS is withholding key presses it also compares the process a press was addressed to with its own and asks macOS when a key was last pressed anywhere. Nothing is written to disk, logged or sent.
- No privileges. No kernel extension, no root, no helper tool, no separate background service. The keyboard's control interface is a vendor HID interface that macOS lets ordinary apps open.
- Writes are deliberate. Anything the app writes to the keyboard's onboard profile in flash goes through a read-modify-write that is verified by reading it back. Two writes are not read back: the save that runs as the app quits, so that quitting is not held up (it waits at most eight seconds, and the next launch reads the flash again), and the OLED image stored with Save to keyboard, which is a single command.
- Profiles are data that reconfigure your keyboard. Import only profile files you trust: a profile can remap keys on any layer, including the Fn layer's factory shortcuts, and applying one is saved into the keyboard's flash a few seconds later. Importing never applies a profile by itself.
- Releases are built by CI from a tag. Each release carries
SHA256SUMS, which only catches a damaged download, and a build provenance attestation, which ties the file to this repository's release workflow. Check it withgh attestation verify <file> --repo Rikearon/apex-control --signer-workflow Rikearon/apex-control/.github/workflows/release.yml(GitHub CLI 2.97 or later, signed in: older versions can be fooled by look-alike names), or, without a GitHub login, with the.sigstore.jsonbundle attached to the release and--bundle.