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Findings: six healthy Kubernetes workload pods emitted 4,183 sandbox network notification denied warnings in 12 hours. Nearly all were syscall 52 returning ENOTCONN; the remainder were syscall 62 returning ESRCH. All pods stayed Ready with zero restarts and there were no error-level runtime logs. Current main logs every dispatch_notification error at WARN, regardless of whether it represents an enforcement decision or an expected process/socket race.
Remaining reason for filing: these per-syscall warnings are high-volume and misleading, and obscure actionable policy or boundary failures.
Description
Actual behavior: The RFC 0012 sandbox network broker emits a WARN for every failed seccomp notification dispatch:
WARN openshell_sandbox::network_broker: sandbox network notification denied (tid=..., syscall=52): Socket not connected (os error 107)
WARN openshell_sandbox::network_broker: sandbox network notification denied (tid=..., syscall=62): No such process (os error 3)
During a 12-hour observation of six active agent workloads, this produced 4,183 network-broker warnings. The workloads remained Ready, had zero restarts, and recorded no error-level runtime events. A two-hour sample was dominated by 910 ENOTCONN warnings and 34 ESRCH warnings.
The current handler groups all dispatch_notification errors under the message sandbox network notification denied, even when the returned errno describes a socket/process race rather than an OpenShell policy denial. This makes benign application behavior look like a security or isolation failure and makes genuine broker failures difficult to find.
Expected behavior: Expected transient process/socket races should not create one warning per syscall. They should be handled at debug/trace level, aggregated, or rate-limited. Genuine OpenShell policy denials and broker-health failures must remain clearly observable and distinguishable from application-originated errnos.
Reproduction Steps
Deploy the RFC 0012 sandbox runtime on Linux with seccomp network mediation enabled.
Run a long-lived agent workload that performs ordinary concurrent HTTP/socket activity and periodically starts and exits subprocesses.
Collect the workload pod's runtime logs for several polling cycles.
Agent Diagnostic
diagnose, OpenShell repositorycreate-github-issue, and cluster inspection workflows0.0.117-dev.211+g4cd5e5478v0.0.116; the issue reproduces on a newer development build containing the RFC 0012 sandbox runtimev0.0.116, RFC 0012 implementation PR feat(isolation): implement the RFC 0012 sandbox architecture #2942, and currentmainnetwork-broker handlingnetwork notification deniedtext,Socket not connected, and related network/boundary warnings. No matching issue was found. bug(supervisor-network): boundary reconnect is followed by proxy exit and ControlSupervisorExited #3396 concerns a boundary reconnect that becomes fatal; the sandboxes here remained healthy.sandbox network notification deniedwarnings in 12 hours. Nearly all were syscall 52 returningENOTCONN; the remainder were syscall 62 returningESRCH. All pods stayed Ready with zero restarts and there were no error-level runtime logs. Currentmainlogs everydispatch_notificationerror atWARN, regardless of whether it represents an enforcement decision or an expected process/socket race.Description
Actual behavior: The RFC 0012 sandbox network broker emits a
WARNfor every failed seccomp notification dispatch:During a 12-hour observation of six active agent workloads, this produced 4,183 network-broker warnings. The workloads remained Ready, had zero restarts, and recorded no error-level runtime events. A two-hour sample was dominated by 910
ENOTCONNwarnings and 34ESRCHwarnings.The current handler groups all
dispatch_notificationerrors under the messagesandbox network notification denied, even when the returned errno describes a socket/process race rather than an OpenShell policy denial. This makes benign application behavior look like a security or isolation failure and makes genuine broker failures difficult to find.Expected behavior: Expected transient process/socket races should not create one warning per syscall. They should be handled at debug/trace level, aggregated, or rate-limited. Genuine OpenShell policy denials and broker-health failures must remain clearly observable and distinguishable from application-originated errnos.
Reproduction Steps
sandbox network notification deniedmessages.ENOTCONNand syscall 62/ESRCHwarnings while the sandbox remains Ready and functional.Environment
v1.35.7-gke.1222000v0.5.0, v1beta1 API0.0.117-dev.211+g4cd5e54780.0.0-dev, RFC 0012 separate workload and supervisor podsv0.0.116; the tested development build is newerLogs
Acceptance Criteria
ENOTCONNandESRCHprocess/socket races do not emit an unboundedWARNper syscall.