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root - chore: defense - stage npm publishes from packed tarballs #74

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Merged
jaredwray merged 3 commits into from
Sep 9, 2026
Merged

root - chore: defense - stage npm publishes from packed tarballs #74

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e266c06
root - chore: defense - stage npm publishes from packed tarballs
cursoragent Sep 9, 2026
df2908d
docs: mark stage publish as PR #74 pending
cursoragent Sep 9, 2026
cb521ef
docs: leave npm-token secrets item unchecked
cursoragent Sep 9, 2026
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12 changes: 10 additions & 2 deletions .github/workflows/release.yaml
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Expand Up @@ -48,5 +48,13 @@ jobs:
- name: Testing
run: pnpm test:ci

- name: Publish
run: pnpm publish --provenance --no-git-checks --ignore-scripts --access public
- name: Pack
run: |
mkdir -p packed
pnpm pack --pack-destination packed
ls -la packed

- name: Stage publish
# pnpm ≥ 11.3. --no-git-checks: git-checks run even for a tarball and
# fail on a detached release-tag checkout and on the untracked pack output.
run: pnpm stage publish ./packed/*.tgz --access public --provenance --no-git-checks
6 changes: 3 additions & 3 deletions DEFENSE_IN_DEPTH.md
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Expand Up @@ -31,12 +31,12 @@ Profile: npm library · public
- [x] Workflow `name:` and job `name:` contain no spaces (kebab-case) so they can be set as required status checks — verified 2026-09-09
- [x] `persist-credentials: false` on checkouts that don't push — PR #72
- [x] No `pull_request_target` on workflows that run untrusted PR code — verified 2026-09-09
- [ ] Artifact-publishing workflows disable `actions/setup-node` default caching (`package-manager-cache: false`) to prevent cache poisoning (PR #73 pending)
- [ ] No npm tokens (or other registry credentials) in Actions secrets
- [x] Artifact-publishing workflows disable `actions/setup-node` default caching (`package-manager-cache: false`) to prevent cache poisoning — PR #73
- [ ] No npm tokens (or other registry credentials) in Actions secrets — workflows have no NPM_TOKEN/NODE_AUTH_TOKEN refs; Actions secrets could not be listed (403)

## 5. npm publishing — npm libraries only
- [ ] OIDC trusted publishing configured **stage-only** on npmjs.com for the publish workflow — it can stage, never publish live (manual)
- [ ] `.github/workflows/release.yaml` packs then stages with `pnpm stage publish ./packed/*.tgz --no-git-checks`
- [ ] `.github/workflows/release.yaml` packs then stages with `pnpm stage publish ./packed/*.tgz --no-git-checks` (PR #74 pending)
- [ ] Maintainer promotes staged versions with 2FA (manual)
- [ ] Drydock connected — staged releases reviewed before promotion (manual)
- [ ] No direct publish rights: package requires 2FA and disallows tokens (manual)
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1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions SECURITY.md
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Expand Up @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ hardening checklist; progress is tracked in [DEFENSE_IN_DEPTH.md](./DEFENSE_IN_D
- Dependencies install through pnpm with a 7-day cooldown on new versions, lifecycle scripts blocked by default, `trustPolicy: no-downgrade`, and exotic subdependencies blocked.
- The lockfile is committed and CI installs with `--frozen-lockfile`. There is no Dependabot config; dependency updates go through reviewed PRs.
- CI workflows default to read-only `contents: read` permissions; generated output is never committed back from CI; every action is pinned to a full commit SHA; Socket Firewall (`sfw`) wraps `pnpm install`; zizmor lints workflows on every PR; checkouts that do not push set `persist-credentials: false`.
- The release workflow disables `setup-node` package-manager caching.
- Workflows do not use `pull_request_target`.
- The published package sets `repository.url` to this repo so provenance can map back.
- `.github/CODEOWNERS` names `@jaredwray` for `/.github/`, `/.vscode/`, `/.cursor/`, `/.devcontainer/`, and `/scripts/`.
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