Skip to content

Security: DT-Foss/FORGE

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Supported disclosure snapshot

Security reports should identify an exact commit. The currently supported public research snapshot is prior-art-2026-08-09; the moving main branch may contain later research changes.

Report privately

Use GitHub's Report a vulnerability function in the repository Security tab. Do not open a public issue for a vulnerability until the maintainer has coordinated disclosure.

Never include any of the following in a public issue, pull request, CI log, or discussion:

  • credentials, tokens, private keys, cookies, personal data, or private URLs;
  • a real target IP/domain, customer/operator identifier, or production log;
  • exploit code or transcripts against a non-lab system;
  • unredacted session, audit, database, crash-dump, or generated payload files;
  • instructions that require unauthorized access or live offensive execution.

Useful report contents

Provide:

  1. the exact tag and commit;
  2. affected file, symbol, artifact schema, and authority/lifecycle stage;
  3. a minimal deterministic reproducer using synthetic data in an isolated lab;
  4. expected and observed behavior;
  5. security impact and realistic preconditions;
  6. whether the issue crosses SEARCH/EVALUATION, report/inference, candidate/ACTIVE, static/mutable, host/process, or generation/rollback boundaries; and
  7. a suggested regression test if known.

Reports should avoid destructive payloads. If a proof requires a dangerous artifact, first send only a description and digest and wait for a safe transfer method.

Scope priorities

High-priority classes include:

  • a secret or private operator artifact in the public Git history/release;
  • outcome/evaluator data becoming visible to a sealed search lane;
  • report-qualified material becoming inference or executable authority;
  • a forged/copied mutable fragment obtaining legacy static authority;
  • a program executing without an exact recursively valid ACTIVE binding;
  • quarantine bypass or stale authority surviving refutation;
  • acquired repository code being imported or executed during static intake;
  • archive traversal, link escape, SSRF or DNS-rebinding in research intake;
  • source generation adoption without paired evidence or pointer CAS;
  • rollback selecting bytes other than the verified parent generation; or
  • command construction that crosses the declared argv/no-shell boundary.

The presence or quality of an intentionally disclosed offensive capability is not itself a vulnerability. A containment, authority, privacy, integrity, or unexpected-execution failure around that capability may be.

Safe harbor

No independent safe-harbor license is granted by this file. Obtain explicit written authorization before testing any system. Repository visibility and a request for vulnerability reports do not authorize access, execution, deployment, scanning, exploitation, or circumvention.

Disclosure handling

The maintainer will try to acknowledge a complete report, reproduce it against the named commit, prepare a regression test/fix, and coordinate a public note. No response time, bounty, embargo, or acceptance is guaranteed.

There aren't any published security advisories