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nesquena-hermes
271 lines
11 KiB
Python
271 lines
11 KiB
Python
"""Tests for `api.session_export_html` palette injection.
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These guard the contract that:
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1. A palette captured from the live WebUI (getComputedStyle) flows through the
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export and overrides the inlined fallback so the file matches the user's
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active theme + skin.
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2. The palette is sanitised so a hostile client cannot break out of the
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`<style>` block via CSS injection.
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3. When no palette is supplied (CLI / direct API consumers), the existing
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dark/light fallback still renders unchanged.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from api.session_export_html import (
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_content_to_text,
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_neutralize_remote_images,
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_palette_to_css,
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_render_markdown,
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render_session_html,
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)
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def _fake_session() -> dict:
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return {
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"session_id": "abc123",
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"title": "Palette test",
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"model": "gpt-test",
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"messages": [
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{"role": "user", "content": "hi"},
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{"role": "assistant", "content": "hello back"},
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],
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}
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------- sanitiser ---
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def test_palette_to_css_accepts_hex_rgb_and_color_mix() -> None:
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out = _palette_to_css({
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"bg": "#FAF7F0",
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"accent": "rgb(184, 134, 11)",
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"border": "color-mix(in srgb, #000 60%, transparent)",
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})
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assert out.startswith(":root,:root.dark{")
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assert "--bg:#FAF7F0;" in out
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assert "--accent:rgb(184, 134, 11);" in out
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assert "color-mix" in out
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def test_palette_to_css_strips_invalid_names_and_values() -> None:
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# Bad name (contains ;{}) is dropped; bad value (style-break attempt) is dropped.
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out = _palette_to_css({
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"; }body{display:none": "#fff", # malicious name
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"bg": "red; }body{display:none", # malicious value
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"border": "#abc", # legit, must survive
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})
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assert "display:none" not in out
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assert ";}body{" not in out
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# The legit entry still makes it through, even when paired with hostile siblings.
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assert "--border:#abc;" in out
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def test_palette_to_css_empty_input_returns_empty_string() -> None:
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assert _palette_to_css({}) == ""
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assert _palette_to_css(None) == "" # type: ignore[arg-type]
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def test_palette_to_css_caps_value_length() -> None:
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# A pathologically long value should be rejected rather than embedded.
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out = _palette_to_css({"bg": "#" + ("a" * 200)})
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assert out == ""
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def test_palette_to_css_drops_fetchable_url_values() -> None:
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# A value carrying a fetchable url() must be dropped: the charset has no
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# `/`, `:`, `'` or `"`, so a real `url(http://...)` / `url(/path)` can't
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# survive — pinning that so the no-outbound-request guarantee can't
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# silently regress if the charset is ever widened.
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out = _palette_to_css({
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"bg": "url(http://evil.example/x.png)", # protocol-bearing
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"fg": "url(//evil.example/x.png)", # scheme-relative
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"accent": "url(/leak/signed-url)", # path-bearing
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"border": "url('http://evil.example/y')", # quoted
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"ok": "#abc", # legit sibling survives
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})
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assert "evil.example" not in out
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assert "url(http" not in out
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assert "url(//" not in out
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assert "url(/" not in out
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# The one safe entry still makes it through.
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assert "--ok:#abc;" in out
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------- end-to-end ---
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def test_render_without_palette_uses_builtin_fallback() -> None:
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html = render_session_html(_fake_session(), theme="dark")
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# Built-in dark palette is present; no extra `:root{...}` override was appended.
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assert "--bg:#0D0D1A" in html # dark fallback
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# The inlined CSS contains exactly one bare `:root{` (the light defaults) and
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# one `:root.dark{` (the dark overrides). No `palette_css` override block.
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assert html.count(":root{") == 1
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assert html.count(":root.dark{") == 1
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assert '<html lang="en" class="dark">' in html
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def test_render_with_palette_appends_override_after_builtin() -> None:
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palette = {"bg": "#FAF7F0", "text": "#1A1610", "accent": "#B8860B"}
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html = render_session_html(_fake_session(), theme="light", palette=palette)
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builtin_pos = html.find(":root{--bg:#FEFCF7") # light fallback marker
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override_pos = html.rfind(":root,:root.dark{--bg:#FAF7F0") # our override
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assert builtin_pos > 0, "light fallback should still be inlined"
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assert override_pos > builtin_pos, (
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"palette override must come AFTER the built-in CSS so it actually wins; "
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f"builtin@{builtin_pos} override@{override_pos}"
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)
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assert "--accent:#B8860B;" in html
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# No <html class="dark"> when theme=light.
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assert 'class="dark"' not in html
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def test_render_with_hostile_palette_drops_bad_entries_but_keeps_safe_ones() -> None:
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html = render_session_html(
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_fake_session(),
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theme="light",
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palette={"bg": "red;}body{display:none", "border": "#abc"},
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)
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assert "display:none" not in html
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assert "--border:#abc;" in html
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def test_render_dark_mode_palette_overrides_builtin_dark() -> None:
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"""Regression: captured palette must win in dark mode (the default theme).
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_CSS defines :root.dark{…} at specificity (0,0,2,0). The palette override
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must match or beat that specificity so it actually applies when the export is
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rendered with <html class="dark">. Without the fix the palette was silently
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ignored and the export fell back to the generic dark theme.
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"""
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palette = {"bg": "#112233", "text": "#EEDDCC", "accent": "#FF5500"}
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html = render_session_html(_fake_session(), theme="dark", palette=palette)
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# The exported HTML uses dark mode.
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assert '<html lang="en" class="dark">' in html
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# The palette override block is present with both selectors.
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assert ":root,:root.dark{" in html
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# The captured values appear in the override block (not just the fallback).
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assert "--bg:#112233;" in html
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assert "--text:#EEDDCC;" in html
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assert "--accent:#FF5500;" in html
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# The override comes AFTER the built-in :root.dark block so source-order wins.
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builtin_dark_pos = html.find(":root.dark{--bg:#0D0D1A")
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override_pos = html.find(":root,:root.dark{--bg:#112233")
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assert builtin_dark_pos > 0
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assert override_pos > builtin_dark_pos, (
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"palette override must come after built-in :root.dark so it wins; "
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f"builtin_dark@{builtin_dark_pos} override@{override_pos}"
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)
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def test_palette_to_css_drops_expression_values() -> None:
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"""expression() is IE-only CSS-eval; must be rejected as defense-in-depth."""
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out = _palette_to_css({
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"bg": "expression(alert(1))",
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"fg": "Expression( document.cookie )",
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"accent": "EXPRESSION(0)",
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"ok": "#abc", # legit sibling survives
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})
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assert "expression" not in out.lower()
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assert "--ok:#abc;" in out
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# ----------------------------------------------------- self-contained images ---
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def _image_content(url: str) -> list:
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return [
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{"type": "text", "text": "look at this"},
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{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": url}},
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]
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def test_remote_image_url_is_flattened_to_inert_text() -> None:
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# A remote http(s) image must NOT become a Markdown image (which would
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# render as <img src="http..."> and fire a network request on open, leaking
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# a signed/private URL). It is flattened to an inline-code placeholder that
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# still records the URL so the transcript isn't lossy.
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remote = "https://example.com/private/signed.png?sig=secret"
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flat = _content_to_text(_image_content(remote))
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assert "![image]" not in flat # not an active image
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assert f"`[image: {remote}]`" in flat # inert, URL preserved
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def test_data_uri_image_is_kept_as_inline_image() -> None:
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# data: URIs are already self-contained (no network), so they stay as a real
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# Markdown image and render offline.
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data_uri = ""
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flat = _content_to_text(_image_content(data_uri))
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assert f"" in flat
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def test_remote_image_never_appears_as_active_img_in_full_html() -> None:
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# End-to-end guard regardless of whether markdown_it is installed: the
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# rendered document must not contain an <img> pointing at the remote URL.
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remote = "https://example.com/leak.png?token=abc"
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html = render_session_html(
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{"session_id": "img1", "title": "t",
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"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": _image_content(remote)}]},
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theme="dark",
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)
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assert f'src="{remote}"' not in html
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assert remote in html # still present as inert text
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# ------------------------------------------- markdown-image-in-text (P1 #4968) ---
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#
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# The multimodal-part flattening above only covers structured image_url content.
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# A *text* message body carrying Markdown image syntax —  —
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# is rendered by markdown_it into an active <img src="https://...">, which fires
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# a network request on open and leaks signed/private URLs. _neutralize_remote_images
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# closes that path post-render. These tests pin it.
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def test_text_markdown_remote_image_is_neutralized() -> None:
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remote = "https://example.com/private.png?sig=secret"
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out = _render_markdown(f"here is a leak ")
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# Core security invariant holds in BOTH environments:
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# - markdown_it present -> <img> rendered then neutralized to placeholder
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# - markdown_it absent -> fallback escapes into <pre>, never an <img>
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assert "<img" not in out # no active image element
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assert f'src="{remote}"' not in out # remote src never emitted
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assert remote in out # URL kept as inert text
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from api.session_export_html import _MD
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if _MD is not None:
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assert "[image:" in out # shown via placeholder
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def test_text_markdown_data_uri_image_is_kept() -> None:
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# data: images are already embedded and offline-safe. With markdown_it they
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# render as an active <img>; without it the fallback keeps the data: URI as
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# escaped text. Either way the URI is preserved and no remote fetch occurs.
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data_uri = ""
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out = _render_markdown(f"embedded ")
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assert data_uri in out
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from api.session_export_html import _MD
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if _MD is not None:
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assert "<img" in out
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def test_neutralize_handles_single_quoted_and_uppercase_src() -> None:
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# Defensive: the regex must catch single-quoted src and tag-case variants,
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# not just the canonical markdown_it output.
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assert "<img" not in _neutralize_remote_images("<img src='http://h/x.png'>")
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assert "<img" not in _neutralize_remote_images('<IMG SRC="http://h/x.png">')
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# data: survives regardless of quoting/case.
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kept = _neutralize_remote_images("<IMG src=''>")
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assert "<IMG" in kept or "<img" in kept
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def test_text_markdown_remote_image_absent_from_full_html() -> None:
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# End-to-end: a remote markdown image in a plain-text turn must not survive
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# as an <img> in the exported document.
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remote = "https://example.com/leak2.png?token=xyz"
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html = render_session_html(
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{"session_id": "md-img", "title": "t",
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"messages": [{"role": "assistant", "content": f"see "}]},
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theme="dark",
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)
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assert f'src="{remote}"' not in html
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assert remote in html # inert text placeholder
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