mirror of
https://github.com/nesquena/hermes-webui.git
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nesquena-hermes
ed7bd05530
The /api/transcribe/capability probe's resolve_provider() only knew the built-in STT providers, so an explicit stt.provider mapping to a Hermes command-type provider was reported unavailable and the browser fell back unnecessarily. Add command_provider_available(), delegating to the agent's _resolve_command_stt_provider_config(provider, cfg) as the single source of truth, consulted as the final fallthrough after the built-in chain (the agent rejects built-in names internally, so ordering can't shadow a native provider). Added a clarifying comment that command providers are intentionally omitted from the auto-detect tuple to match the agent's _get_provider() precedence. Co-authored-by: LLMinem <LLMinem@users.noreply.github.com>
706 lines
31 KiB
Python
706 lines
31 KiB
Python
"""
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Hermes Web UI -- File upload: multipart parser and upload handler.
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"""
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import mimetypes
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import os
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import re as _re
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import email.parser
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import tempfile
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from pathlib import Path
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from api.config import MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES, STATE_DIR
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from api.helpers import j, bad
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from api.models import get_session
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from api.workspace import (
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safe_resolve_ws,
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resolve_trusted_workspace,
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open_anchored_create_fd,
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make_anchored_dir,
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rmtree_anchored,
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unlink_anchored,
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)
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def _max_extracted_bytes() -> int:
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"""Total-extracted-bytes cap for archive uploads (zip/tar-bomb guard).
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Independently tunable from the upload size cap via
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HERMES_WEBUI_MAX_EXTRACTED_MB; defaults to 10x the upload cap. Read at call
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time (not import) so the value reflects the running process's environment
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and is exercisable by tests against the out-of-process test server.
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"""
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raw = os.getenv("HERMES_WEBUI_MAX_EXTRACTED_MB", "").strip()
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if raw:
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try:
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mb = float(raw)
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if mb > 0:
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return int(mb * 1024 * 1024)
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except ValueError:
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pass
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return 10 * MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES
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# Back-compat module constant (some call sites / tests reference it). The
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# authoritative value is _max_extracted_bytes(), read at extraction time.
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_MAX_EXTRACTED_BYTES = 10 * MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES
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def parse_multipart(rfile, content_type, content_length) -> tuple:
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import re as _re, email.parser as _ep
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# Imported locally (not just module-level) so the function stays
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# self-contained — some tests exec() this function's source in an isolated
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# namespace, and a bare module global would NameError there.
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try:
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from api.config import MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES as _MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES
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except Exception:
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_MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES = 20 * 1024 * 1024
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m = _re.search(r'boundary=([^;\s]+)', content_type)
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if not m:
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raise ValueError('No boundary in Content-Type')
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boundary = m.group(1).strip('"').encode()
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# Centralized length guard for ALL upload callers: a missing/garbage or
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# NEGATIVE Content-Length must never reach rfile.read(<0), which reads the
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# stream unbounded (read(-1) == read-to-EOF) and bypasses the per-handler
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# size cap. Reject anything not in [0, MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES].
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try:
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length = int(content_length)
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except (TypeError, ValueError):
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raise ValueError('Invalid Content-Length') from None
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if length < 0:
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raise ValueError('Invalid Content-Length (negative)')
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if length > _MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES:
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raise ValueError(f'Upload too large (max {_MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES} bytes)')
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raw = rfile.read(length)
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fields = {}
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files = {}
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delimiter = b'--' + boundary
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end_marker = b'--' + boundary + b'--'
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parts = raw.split(delimiter)
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for part in parts[1:]:
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stripped = part.lstrip(b'\r\n')
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if stripped.startswith(b'--'):
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break
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sep = b'\r\n\r\n' if b'\r\n\r\n' in part else b'\n\n'
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if sep not in part:
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continue
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header_raw, body = part.split(sep, 1)
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if body.endswith(b'\r\n'):
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body = body[:-2]
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elif body.endswith(b'\n'):
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body = body[:-1]
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header_text = header_raw.lstrip(b'\r\n').decode('utf-8', errors='replace')
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msg = _ep.HeaderParser().parsestr(header_text)
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disp = msg.get('Content-Disposition', '')
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name_m = _re.search(r'name="([^"]*)"', disp)
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file_m = _re.search(r'filename="([^"]*)"', disp)
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if not name_m:
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continue
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name = name_m.group(1)
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if file_m:
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files[name] = (file_m.group(1), body)
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else:
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fields[name] = body.decode('utf-8', errors='replace')
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return fields, files
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def _sanitize_upload_name(filename: str) -> str:
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safe_name = _re.sub(r'[^\w.\-]', '_', Path(filename).name)[:200]
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if not safe_name or safe_name.strip('.') == '':
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raise ValueError('Invalid filename')
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return safe_name
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def _attachment_root() -> Path:
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"""Return the configured upload inbox root.
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Plain chat attachments are transient context for the agent, not project
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source files. Keep them out of the active workspace by default while still
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allowing operators to move the inbox with HERMES_WEBUI_ATTACHMENT_DIR.
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"""
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override = os.getenv('HERMES_WEBUI_ATTACHMENT_DIR', '').strip()
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if override:
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return Path(override).expanduser().resolve()
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return (STATE_DIR / 'attachments').resolve()
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def _upload_destination(session_id: str, safe_name: str) -> Path:
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dest_dir = _session_attachment_dir(session_id)
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dest_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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dest = (dest_dir / safe_name).resolve()
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if not dest.is_relative_to(dest_dir):
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raise ValueError('Invalid upload destination')
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if dest.exists():
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stem = dest.stem
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suffix = dest.suffix
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for idx in range(1, 1000):
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candidate = (dest_dir / f'{stem}-{idx}{suffix}').resolve()
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if not candidate.is_relative_to(dest_dir):
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raise ValueError('Invalid upload destination')
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if not candidate.exists():
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return candidate
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raise ValueError('Too many uploads with the same filename')
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return dest
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def _session_attachment_dir(session_id: str, *, root: Path | None = None) -> Path:
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root = (root or _attachment_root()).resolve()
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dest_dir = (root / _re.sub(r'[^\w.\-]', '_', str(session_id or 'session'))[:120]).resolve()
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if not dest_dir.is_relative_to(root):
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raise ValueError('Invalid attachment directory')
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return dest_dir
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def handle_upload(handler):
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import traceback as _tb
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try:
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content_type = handler.headers.get('Content-Type', '')
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content_length = int(handler.headers.get('Content-Length', 0) or 0)
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if content_length > MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES:
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return j(handler, {'error': f'File too large (max {MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES//1024//1024}MB)'}, status=413)
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fields, files = parse_multipart(handler.rfile, content_type, content_length)
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session_id = fields.get('session_id', '')
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if 'file' not in files:
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return j(handler, {'error': 'No file field in request'}, status=400)
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filename, file_bytes = files['file']
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if not filename:
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return j(handler, {'error': 'No filename in upload'}, status=400)
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try:
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s = get_session(session_id)
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except KeyError:
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return j(handler, {'error': 'Session not found'}, status=404)
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safe_name = _sanitize_upload_name(filename)
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dest = _upload_destination(session_id, safe_name)
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dest.write_bytes(file_bytes)
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mime = mimetypes.guess_type(safe_name)[0] or 'application/octet-stream'
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return j(handler, {
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'filename': dest.name,
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'path': str(dest),
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'size': dest.stat().st_size,
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'mime': mime,
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'is_image': mime.startswith('image/'),
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})
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except ValueError as e:
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return j(handler, {'error': str(e)}, status=400)
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except Exception:
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print('[webui] upload error: ' + _tb.format_exc(), flush=True)
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return j(handler, {'error': 'Upload failed'}, status=500)
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def extract_archive(file_bytes: bytes, filename: str, workspace: Path):
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"""Extract a zip or tar archive into the workspace.
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Returns a dict with ``extracted`` (int), ``files`` (list[str]).
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Raises ValueError on zip-slip or unsupported format.
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"""
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import zipfile, tarfile, io, os, shutil
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cap = _max_extracted_bytes()
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name = Path(filename).name
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stem = Path(filename).stem # strip .zip / .tar.gz etc.
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if name.lower().endswith(('.zip',)):
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_mode = 'zip'
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elif name.lower().endswith(('.tar', '.tar.gz', '.tgz', '.tar.bz2', '.tbz2', '.tar.xz', '.txz')):
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_mode = 'tar'
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else:
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raise ValueError(f'Unsupported archive format: {filename}')
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# Determine destination directory — use archive stem as folder name
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dest_dir = safe_resolve_ws(workspace, stem)
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# Avoid overwriting existing files by appending a suffix (bounded — astronomically
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# unlikely to collide, but never spin forever).
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if dest_dir.exists():
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import string, random
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for _ in range(1000):
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if not dest_dir.exists():
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break
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suffix = ''.join(random.choices(string.digits, k=3))
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dest_dir = safe_resolve_ws(workspace, stem).with_name(stem + '_' + suffix)
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else:
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raise ValueError('Could not allocate a unique extraction directory')
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# #3398: create the extraction root race-safely under the true workspace root.
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make_anchored_dir(workspace, dest_dir)
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# Member-count cap: a tiny archive with millions of (possibly empty) members
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# slips under the byte cap but can exhaust inodes / file descriptors. Bound it.
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_MAX_ARCHIVE_MEMBERS = 10000
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extracted_files = []
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total_extracted = 0
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try:
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if _mode == 'zip':
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with zipfile.ZipFile(io.BytesIO(file_bytes)) as zf:
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for member in zf.infolist():
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# Skip directories
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if member.is_dir():
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continue
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if len(extracted_files) >= _MAX_ARCHIVE_MEMBERS:
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raise ValueError(
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f'Archive has too many files (> {_MAX_ARCHIVE_MEMBERS}). '
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f'Possible archive bomb.'
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)
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# Zip-slip protection
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member_path = (dest_dir / member.filename).resolve()
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if not member_path.is_relative_to(dest_dir.resolve()):
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raise ValueError(f'Zip-slip blocked: {member.filename}')
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# Zip-bomb protection: track actual extracted bytes (not declared file_size)
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if total_extracted > cap:
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raise ValueError(
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f'Extraction too large ({total_extracted // (1024*1024)} MB > '
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f'{cap // (1024*1024)} MB limit). '
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f'Possible zip bomb.'
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)
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# #3398: open_anchored_create_fd creates intermediate dirs
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# race-safely under the true workspace root (anchored mkdirat),
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# so no pathname member_path.parent.mkdir() before it (which
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# could be redirected outside by a raced symlink component).
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_mfd = open_anchored_create_fd(workspace, member_path)
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with zf.open(member) as src, os.fdopen(_mfd, 'wb', closefd=True) as dst:
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_chunk_size = 65536
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while True:
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chunk = src.read(_chunk_size)
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if not chunk:
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break
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total_extracted += len(chunk)
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if total_extracted > cap:
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raise ValueError(
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f'Extraction too large (> '
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f'{cap // (1024*1024)} MB limit). '
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f'Possible zip bomb.'
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)
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dst.write(chunk)
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extracted_files.append(str(member_path.relative_to(workspace.resolve())))
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elif _mode == 'tar':
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with tarfile.open(fileobj=io.BytesIO(file_bytes)) as tf:
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for member in tf.getmembers():
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if not member.isfile():
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continue
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if len(extracted_files) >= _MAX_ARCHIVE_MEMBERS:
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raise ValueError(
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f'Archive has too many files (> {_MAX_ARCHIVE_MEMBERS}). '
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f'Possible archive bomb.'
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)
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# Tar-slip protection
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member_path = (dest_dir / member.name).resolve()
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if not member_path.is_relative_to(dest_dir.resolve()):
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raise ValueError(f'Tar-slip blocked: {member.name}')
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# Tar-bomb protection: track actual extracted bytes (not declared size)
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if total_extracted > cap:
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raise ValueError(
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f'Extraction too large ({total_extracted // (1024*1024)} MB > '
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f'{cap // (1024*1024)} MB limit). '
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f'Possible zip bomb.'
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)
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# #3398: anchored member create makes intermediate dirs
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# race-safely; no pathname member_path.parent.mkdir() first.
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src_obj = tf.extractfile(member)
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if src_obj:
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# #3398: fd-anchored member create under the TRUE workspace root.
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_mfd = open_anchored_create_fd(workspace, member_path)
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with src_obj as src, os.fdopen(_mfd, 'wb', closefd=True) as dst:
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_chunk_size = 65536
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while True:
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chunk = src.read(_chunk_size)
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if not chunk:
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break
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total_extracted += len(chunk)
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if total_extracted > cap:
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raise ValueError(
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f'Extraction too large (> '
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f'{cap // (1024*1024)} MB limit). '
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f'Possible zip bomb.'
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)
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dst.write(chunk)
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extracted_files.append(str(member_path.relative_to(workspace.resolve())))
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except Exception:
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# Clean up partially-extracted directory to avoid orphaned folders
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try:
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rmtree_anchored(workspace, dest_dir)
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except Exception:
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pass
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raise
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return {'extracted': len(extracted_files), 'files': extracted_files, 'dest': str(dest_dir)}
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def handle_upload_extract(handler):
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"""Handle archive upload and extraction."""
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import traceback as _tb
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try:
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content_type = handler.headers.get('Content-Type', '')
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content_length = int(handler.headers.get('Content-Length', 0) or 0)
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if content_length > MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES:
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return j(handler, {'error': f'File too large (max {MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES//1024//1024}MB)'}, status=413)
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fields, files = parse_multipart(handler.rfile, content_type, content_length)
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session_id = fields.get('session_id', '')
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if 'file' not in files:
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return j(handler, {'error': 'No file field in request'}, status=400)
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filename, file_bytes = files['file']
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if not filename:
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return j(handler, {'error': 'No filename in upload'}, status=400)
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try:
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s = get_session(session_id)
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except KeyError:
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return j(handler, {'error': 'Session not found'}, status=404)
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session_dir = _session_attachment_dir(session_id)
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session_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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result = extract_archive(file_bytes, filename, session_dir)
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return j(handler, {'ok': True, **result})
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except ValueError as e:
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return j(handler, {'error': str(e)}, status=400)
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except Exception:
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print('[webui] upload extract error: ' + _tb.format_exc(), flush=True)
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return j(handler, {'error': 'Archive extraction failed'}, status=500)
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def handle_transcribe(handler):
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import traceback as _tb
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temp_path = None
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try:
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content_type = handler.headers.get('Content-Type', '')
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content_length = int(handler.headers.get('Content-Length', 0) or 0)
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if content_length > MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES:
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return j(handler, {'error': f'File too large (max {MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES//1024//1024}MB)'}, status=413)
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fields, files = parse_multipart(handler.rfile, content_type, content_length)
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if 'file' not in files:
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return j(handler, {'error': 'No file field in request'}, status=400)
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filename, file_bytes = files['file']
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if not filename:
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return j(handler, {'error': 'No filename in upload'}, status=400)
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safe_name = _sanitize_upload_name(filename)
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suffix = Path(safe_name).suffix or '.webm'
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with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(prefix='webui-stt-', suffix=suffix, delete=False) as tmp:
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temp_path = tmp.name
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tmp.write(file_bytes)
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try:
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from tools.transcription_tools import transcribe_audio
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except ImportError:
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return j(handler, {'error': 'Speech-to-text is unavailable on this server'}, status=503)
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result = transcribe_audio(temp_path)
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if not result.get('success'):
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msg = str(result.get('error') or 'Transcription failed')
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status = 503 if 'unavailable' in msg.lower() or 'not configured' in msg.lower() else 400
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return j(handler, {'error': msg}, status=status)
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transcript = str(result.get('transcript') or '').strip()
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return j(handler, {'ok': True, 'transcript': transcript})
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except ValueError as e:
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return j(handler, {'error': str(e)}, status=400)
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except Exception:
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print('[webui] transcribe error: ' + _tb.format_exc(), flush=True)
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return j(handler, {'error': 'Transcription failed'}, status=500)
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finally:
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if temp_path:
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try:
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Path(temp_path).unlink(missing_ok=True)
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except Exception:
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pass
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def _stt_provider_capability_from_module(stt):
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"""Return (available, provider) for a loaded transcription_tools module."""
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try:
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load_cfg = getattr(stt, "_load_stt_config", None)
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stt_config = load_cfg() if callable(load_cfg) else {}
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cfg_dict = stt_config if isinstance(stt_config, dict) else {}
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is_enabled = getattr(stt, "is_stt_enabled", None)
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if callable(is_enabled) and not is_enabled(stt_config):
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return False, "none"
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# Some tests and future agent releases expose the provider decision as a
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# single helper. Use it when the lower-level capability flags are not
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# available. The current agent module exposes the flags below, so the
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# normal path mirrors _get_provider() without triggering its lazy local
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# STT install side effect during a passive web page probe.
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has_internal_flags = any(
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hasattr(stt, name)
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for name in ("_HAS_FASTER_WHISPER", "_HAS_OPENAI", "_HAS_MISTRAL")
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)
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get_provider = getattr(stt, "_get_provider", None)
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if callable(get_provider) and not has_internal_flags:
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provider = str(get_provider(stt_config) or "none")
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return provider not in ("", "none"), provider or "none"
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def env(name):
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getter = getattr(stt, "get_env_value", None)
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try:
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if callable(getter):
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return str(getter(name) or "").strip()
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except Exception:
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return ""
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return os.getenv(name, "").strip()
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def has_local_command():
|
||
helper = getattr(stt, "_has_local_command", None)
|
||
try:
|
||
return bool(helper()) if callable(helper) else False
|
||
except Exception:
|
||
return False
|
||
|
||
def has_browser_audio_converter():
|
||
helper = getattr(stt, "_find_ffmpeg_binary", None)
|
||
try:
|
||
return bool(helper()) if callable(helper) else False
|
||
except Exception:
|
||
return False
|
||
|
||
def has_openai_audio():
|
||
helper = getattr(stt, "_has_openai_audio_backend", None)
|
||
try:
|
||
return bool(helper()) if callable(helper) else False
|
||
except Exception:
|
||
return False
|
||
|
||
def local_command_available():
|
||
# The browser sends WebM/Ogg blobs; the local-command path converts
|
||
# non-WAV input through ffmpeg before invoking the command.
|
||
return has_local_command() and has_browser_audio_converter()
|
||
|
||
def command_provider_available(provider):
|
||
resolver = getattr(stt, "_resolve_command_stt_provider_config", None)
|
||
try:
|
||
return callable(resolver) and resolver(provider, cfg_dict) is not None
|
||
except Exception:
|
||
return False
|
||
|
||
def resolve_provider(provider):
|
||
if provider == "local":
|
||
if bool(getattr(stt, "_HAS_FASTER_WHISPER", False)):
|
||
return "local"
|
||
if local_command_available():
|
||
return "local_command"
|
||
return "none"
|
||
if provider == "local_command":
|
||
if local_command_available():
|
||
return "local_command"
|
||
if bool(getattr(stt, "_HAS_FASTER_WHISPER", False)):
|
||
return "local"
|
||
return "none"
|
||
if provider == "groq":
|
||
return "groq" if bool(getattr(stt, "_HAS_OPENAI", False)) and bool(env("GROQ_API_KEY")) else "none"
|
||
if provider == "openai":
|
||
return "openai" if bool(getattr(stt, "_HAS_OPENAI", False)) and has_openai_audio() else "none"
|
||
if provider == "mistral":
|
||
return "mistral" if bool(getattr(stt, "_HAS_MISTRAL", False)) and bool(env("MISTRAL_API_KEY")) else "none"
|
||
if provider == "xai":
|
||
try:
|
||
from tools.xai_http import resolve_xai_http_credentials
|
||
|
||
return "xai" if resolve_xai_http_credentials().get("api_key") else "none"
|
||
except Exception:
|
||
return "none"
|
||
if provider == "elevenlabs":
|
||
return "elevenlabs" if bool(env("ELEVENLABS_API_KEY")) else "none"
|
||
if command_provider_available(provider):
|
||
return provider
|
||
return "none"
|
||
|
||
explicit = "provider" in cfg_dict
|
||
if explicit:
|
||
configured = str(cfg_dict.get("provider") or "local")
|
||
provider = resolve_provider(configured)
|
||
return provider != "none", provider if provider != "none" else configured
|
||
|
||
for candidate in ("local", "local_command", "groq", "openai", "mistral", "xai", "elevenlabs"):
|
||
# Command (custom) STT providers are intentionally omitted from this
|
||
# auto-detect tuple to mirror the agent's _get_provider() (transcription_tools.py),
|
||
# which only auto-selects local > groq > openai and never auto-picks a command
|
||
# provider. A command-backed STT activates only via an explicit stt.provider.
|
||
# Do NOT add command providers here without matching the agent, or the WebUI
|
||
# probe will diverge from what the agent actually resolves.
|
||
provider = resolve_provider(candidate)
|
||
if provider != "none":
|
||
return True, provider
|
||
return False, "none"
|
||
except Exception:
|
||
return False, "none"
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
def _stt_provider_capability():
|
||
"""Return (available, provider) for a cheap server-side STT capability probe."""
|
||
try:
|
||
import tools.transcription_tools as stt
|
||
except ImportError:
|
||
return False, "none"
|
||
return _stt_provider_capability_from_module(stt)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def handle_transcribe_capability(handler):
|
||
available, provider = _stt_provider_capability()
|
||
return j(handler, {"ok": True, "available": bool(available), "provider": provider})
|
||
|
||
|
||
def handle_workspace_upload(handler):
|
||
"""Upload a file into a session's workspace directory.
|
||
|
||
Form fields:
|
||
session_id – target session
|
||
path – subdirectory within the workspace (default: '')
|
||
File:
|
||
file – the uploaded file(s)
|
||
"""
|
||
import traceback as _tb
|
||
try:
|
||
content_type = handler.headers.get('Content-Type', '')
|
||
content_length = int(handler.headers.get('Content-Length', 0) or 0)
|
||
if content_length > MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES:
|
||
return j(handler, {'error': f'File too large (max {MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES//1024//1024}MB)'}, status=413)
|
||
|
||
fields, files = parse_multipart(handler.rfile, content_type, content_length)
|
||
session_id = fields.get('session_id', '')
|
||
subpath = fields.get('path', '')
|
||
|
||
if not session_id:
|
||
return j(handler, {'error': 'Missing session_id'}, status=400)
|
||
|
||
if not files:
|
||
return j(handler, {'error': 'No file field in request'}, status=400)
|
||
|
||
# Validate session
|
||
try:
|
||
session = get_session(session_id)
|
||
except KeyError:
|
||
return j(handler, {'error': 'Session not found'}, status=404)
|
||
|
||
# Resolve workspace root from session
|
||
workspace = resolve_trusted_workspace(session.workspace)
|
||
|
||
# Resolve target subdirectory within workspace
|
||
target_dir = safe_resolve_ws(workspace, subpath) if subpath else workspace
|
||
# safe_resolve_ws intentionally permits in-workspace symlinks pointing
|
||
# outside the root (read trust model). For an UPLOAD target that's not
|
||
# acceptable: a planted symlink subpath would let mkdir() + writes create
|
||
# files OUTSIDE the workspace. Require the resolved target to be inside
|
||
# the workspace before creating anything. (is_relative_to is True for the
|
||
# workspace==target equality case, so the normal subpath='' path passes.)
|
||
if not target_dir.resolve().is_relative_to(workspace.resolve()):
|
||
return j(handler, {'error': 'Upload target escapes workspace'}, status=403)
|
||
# #3398: create the upload target dir race-safely under the workspace root
|
||
# (anchored mkdirat) so a raced symlink subpath can't mkdir outside.
|
||
try:
|
||
make_anchored_dir(workspace, target_dir)
|
||
except (ValueError, OSError):
|
||
return j(handler, {'error': 'Upload target escapes workspace'}, status=403)
|
||
|
||
results = []
|
||
for _field_name, (filename, file_bytes) in files.items():
|
||
if not filename:
|
||
continue
|
||
|
||
safe_name = _sanitize_upload_name(filename)
|
||
dest = safe_resolve_ws(target_dir, safe_name)
|
||
|
||
# Path traversal guard (belt-and-suspenders: safe_resolve_ws above is
|
||
# the authoritative guard and raises ValueError on traversal; this
|
||
# check catches any edge case where the resolved path escapes).
|
||
if not dest.resolve().is_relative_to(workspace.resolve()):
|
||
return j(handler, {'error': f'Path traversal blocked: {safe_name}'}, status=403)
|
||
|
||
# Deduplicate: append -1, -2, etc. if file already exists
|
||
if dest.exists():
|
||
stem = dest.stem
|
||
suffix = dest.suffix
|
||
for idx in range(1, 1000):
|
||
candidate = safe_resolve_ws(target_dir, f'{stem}-{idx}{suffix}')
|
||
if not candidate.resolve().is_relative_to(workspace.resolve()):
|
||
return j(handler, {'error': 'Path traversal blocked'}, status=403)
|
||
if not candidate.exists():
|
||
dest = candidate
|
||
break
|
||
else:
|
||
return j(handler, {'error': 'Too many uploads with the same filename'}, status=400)
|
||
|
||
# #3398 TOCTOU hardening: create the destination via an anchored
|
||
# openat-walk from the true workspace root with O_CREAT|O_EXCL|
|
||
# O_NOFOLLOW, so a symlink raced into any path component after the
|
||
# containment checks above cannot redirect the write outside the
|
||
# workspace. The dedup loop guarantees `dest` does not exist.
|
||
try:
|
||
_wfd = open_anchored_create_fd(workspace, dest.resolve())
|
||
except FileExistsError:
|
||
return j(handler, {'error': f'Upload destination already exists: {safe_name}'}, status=409)
|
||
except (ValueError, OSError):
|
||
return j(handler, {'error': f'Path traversal blocked: {safe_name}'}, status=403)
|
||
with os.fdopen(_wfd, 'wb', closefd=True) as _wfh:
|
||
_wfh.write(file_bytes)
|
||
mime = mimetypes.guess_type(safe_name)[0] or 'application/octet-stream'
|
||
|
||
# For archives, optionally extract into the target directory.
|
||
# Suffix set MUST match extract_archive()'s supported formats, else
|
||
# accepted-but-unlisted archives (.tar/.tbz2/.txz) silently land as
|
||
# raw files instead of extracting.
|
||
is_archive = safe_name.lower().endswith(('.zip', '.tar', '.tar.gz', '.tgz', '.tar.bz2', '.tbz2', '.tar.xz', '.txz'))
|
||
if is_archive:
|
||
import zipfile, tarfile, traceback as _extract_tb
|
||
try:
|
||
extraction = extract_archive(file_bytes, safe_name, target_dir)
|
||
# Remove the archive file after successful extraction
|
||
try:
|
||
unlink_anchored(workspace, dest.resolve())
|
||
except FileNotFoundError:
|
||
pass
|
||
results.append({
|
||
'filename': safe_name,
|
||
'path': str(extraction.get('dest', target_dir)),
|
||
'size': len(file_bytes),
|
||
'is_image': False,
|
||
'extracted': True,
|
||
'extracted_files': extraction.get('files', []),
|
||
'extracted_count': extraction.get('extracted', 0),
|
||
})
|
||
continue
|
||
except (zipfile.BadZipFile, tarfile.TarError, ValueError) as e:
|
||
# Extraction failed — remove the archive file (no partial
|
||
# content left behind) and surface the error to the user.
|
||
try:
|
||
unlink_anchored(workspace, dest.resolve())
|
||
except FileNotFoundError:
|
||
pass
|
||
print(f'[webui] workspace upload extract error: {e}', flush=True)
|
||
results.append({
|
||
'filename': safe_name,
|
||
'path': str(target_dir),
|
||
'size': len(file_bytes),
|
||
'mime': mime,
|
||
'is_image': False,
|
||
'extracted': False,
|
||
'extract_error': str(e) or 'Archive extraction failed',
|
||
})
|
||
continue
|
||
except Exception:
|
||
print('[webui] workspace upload extract error: ' + _extract_tb.format_exc(), flush=True)
|
||
try:
|
||
unlink_anchored(workspace, dest.resolve())
|
||
except FileNotFoundError:
|
||
pass
|
||
results.append({
|
||
'filename': safe_name,
|
||
'path': str(target_dir),
|
||
'size': len(file_bytes),
|
||
'mime': mime,
|
||
'is_image': False,
|
||
'extracted': False,
|
||
'extract_error': 'Archive extraction failed',
|
||
})
|
||
continue
|
||
|
||
results.append({
|
||
'filename': dest.name,
|
||
'path': str(dest),
|
||
'size': dest.stat().st_size,
|
||
'mime': mime,
|
||
'is_image': mime.startswith('image/'),
|
||
'extracted': False,
|
||
})
|
||
|
||
if len(results) == 1:
|
||
return j(handler, results[0])
|
||
return j(handler, {'files': results, 'count': len(results)})
|
||
except ValueError as e:
|
||
return j(handler, {'error': str(e)}, status=400)
|
||
except Exception:
|
||
print('[webui] workspace upload error: ' + _tb.format_exc(), flush=True)
|
||
return j(handler, {'error': 'Upload failed'}, status=500)
|