Converged after deep bounce cycles: Finding A (production regression — skipped the
state.db source correction before the CLI filter, dropping WebUI sessions with stale-CLI
sidecar flags) FIXED via _apply_sidebar_state_db_overrides(result) before the routes.py
filter on both index + full-scan paths; Finding B (flaky lineage test) FIXED via hermetic
_persisted_session_ids_snapshot fixture. 16 own tests deterministic. Code byte-faithful
from PR head e1a3ecf22e.
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <agent@nesquena-hermes>
Co-authored-by: santastabber <santastabber@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(security): ignore spoofable forwarded IPs in onboarding gate + make update-check CSRF-safe (#3758, partial)
Ships the two unambiguous slices of #3758's security review. The two slices with
breakage risk for existing installs — the Docker-default public-bind-requires-auth
gate and removing /tmp from the /api/media allowed roots — are held for separate
review/decision.
Onboarding forwarded-IP spoof hardening (+ release-gate CORE fix):
- The unauthenticated first-run onboarding local-network gate now IGNORES
X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP by default (a direct client can spoof them to a
private/loopback address to bypass the gate), trusting them only when
HERMES_WEBUI_TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR=1 is set behind a trusted proxy (rightmost
proxy-appended hop).
- Release-gate (Codex) CORE catch + refinement: when forwarded headers are
present but untrusted, the header is ignored and locality is judged by the raw
socket — but a PRIVATE/LAN raw socket (a separate proxy box that could forward
an arbitrary public client) is no longer treated as local; only a LOOPBACK raw
socket is (genuine same-host; a remote attacker can't forge a 127.0.0.1 TCP
source). This closes the new fail-open the initial refactor introduced (public
client behind a LAN proxy read as local) while preserving genuine same-host
onboarding. LAN-proxy operators must set HERMES_WEBUI_TRUST_FORWARDED_FOR=1.
Regression tests lock the full matrix (spoof-block, LAN-proxy-deny,
loopback-allow, trusted-proxy-rightmost-hop, direct-public-deny).
- Three duplicated inline gate blocks unified into _onboarding_gate_allows /
_onboarding_request_is_local; ONBOARDING_OPEN normalized to canonical truthy
values via _truthy_env.
Update-check CSRF hardening:
- GET /api/updates/check is cache-only (cached_update_status(): no network/git
mutation); forced refresh moves to POST /api/updates/check {force:true}; both
frontend call sites updated and the test_api_timeout contract assertion updated.
- cached_update_status() preserves cached agent info when include_agent re-enabled.
Docker log masking: ENV_OBFUSCATE_PART also masks PASSWORD/SECRET/CREDENTIAL/COOKIE/SESSION.
Held for separate review (NOT in this PR): public-bind-requires-auth startup gate
(server.py + Dockerfile default) and the /api/media /tmp-root removal.
Co-authored-by: fantasticsquirrel <[email protected]>
* docs(changelog): stamp v0.51.307 — Release JW (stage-a3 #3758 partial)
---------
Co-authored-by: nesquena-hermes <[email protected]>
Frank Song