diff --git a/api/routes.py b/api/routes.py
index 31bd0377..ce8d0e50 100644
--- a/api/routes.py
+++ b/api/routes.py
@@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ from api.workspace import (
     read_file_content,
     safe_resolve_ws,
     resolve_trusted_workspace,
+    validate_workspace_to_add,
 )
 from api.upload import handle_upload, handle_transcribe
 from api.streaming import _sse, _run_agent_streaming, cancel_stream
@@ -3029,7 +3030,7 @@ def _handle_workspace_add(handler, body):
     if not path_str:
         return bad(handler, "path is required")
     try:
-        p = resolve_trusted_workspace(path_str)
+        p = validate_workspace_to_add(path_str)
     except ValueError as e:
         return bad(handler, str(e))
     wss = load_workspaces()
diff --git a/api/workspace.py b/api/workspace.py
index b66b42fe..8d194f85 100644
--- a/api/workspace.py
+++ b/api/workspace.py
@@ -430,6 +430,36 @@ def resolve_trusted_workspace(path: str | Path | None = None) -> Path:
     )
 
 
+
+
+def validate_workspace_to_add(path: str) -> Path:
+    """Validate a path for *adding* to the workspace list (less restrictive than resolve_trusted_workspace).
+
+    When a user explicitly adds a new workspace path, we trust their intent — they
+    have console or filesystem access to that path and are consciously registering it.
+    We only block: non-existent paths, non-directories, and known system roots.
+
+    The stricter ``resolve_trusted_workspace`` is used when *using* an existing workspace
+    (file reads/writes) to prevent path traversal after the list is built.
+    """
+    candidate = Path(path).expanduser().resolve()
+
+    if not candidate.exists():
+        raise ValueError(f"Path does not exist: {candidate}")
+    if not candidate.is_dir():
+        raise ValueError(f"Path is not a directory: {candidate}")
+
+    # Block known system roots and their immediate children
+    for blocked in _workspace_blocked_roots():
+        try:
+            candidate.relative_to(blocked)
+            raise ValueError(f"Path points to a system directory: {candidate}")
+        except ValueError as e:
+            if "system directory" in str(e):
+                raise
+
+    return candidate
+
 def safe_resolve_ws(root: Path, requested: str) -> Path:
     """Resolve a relative path inside a workspace root, raising ValueError on traversal."""
     resolved = (root / requested).resolve()
diff --git a/tests/test_sprint3.py b/tests/test_sprint3.py
index 0184854f..4a59de20 100644
--- a/tests/test_sprint3.py
+++ b/tests/test_sprint3.py
@@ -166,12 +166,25 @@ def test_chat_start_rejects_workspace_outside_trusted_root(tmp_path):
     assert "outside" in result.get("error", "").lower()
 
 
-def test_workspace_add_rejects_path_outside_trusted_root(tmp_path):
+def test_workspace_add_allows_external_valid_paths(tmp_path):
+    """Adding a path outside home is now allowed when the user explicitly provides it.
+    The strict trust check (resolve_trusted_workspace) is only applied when *using*
+    an existing workspace, not when registering a new one (validate_workspace_to_add)."""
     outside = tmp_path / "outside-add"
     outside.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
     result, status = post("/api/workspaces/add", {"path": str(outside), "name": "Outside"})
+    # Explicit registration of an external path is now allowed
+    assert status == 200, f"Expected 200, got {status}: {result}"
+    # Verify it was actually saved
+    wss_result, ws_status = get("/api/workspaces")
+    paths = [w["path"] for w in wss_result.get("workspaces", [])]
+    assert str(outside.resolve()) in paths
+
+
+def test_workspace_add_rejects_system_paths():
+    """System paths (/, /etc, /sys) are always rejected even with the relaxed add validation."""
+    _, status = post("/api/workspaces/add", {"path": "/etc", "name": "System"})
     assert status == 400
-    assert "outside" in result.get("error", "").lower()
 
 
 def test_session_new_rejects_workspace_outside_trusted_root(tmp_path):