From 03442b11789d608230543c2015f414b26e7351de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: adamvalves <adamvalves@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Oct 2026 18:39:42 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] docs(ci): add workflow badges and clang-format configuration

- Add GitHub Actions CI workflow, license, language and platform badges
- Introduce standard C++20 .clang-format style rules

Co-authored-by: Google Antigravity <antigravity@google.com>
---
 .clang-format | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 README.md     |  5 +++++
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 .clang-format

diff --git a/.clang-format b/.clang-format
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d621bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.clang-format
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+BasedOnStyle: LLVM
+Language: Cpp
+Standard: c++20
+IndentWidth: 4
+TabWidth: 4
+UseTab: Never
+ColumnLimit: 120
+PointerAlignment: Right
+ReferenceAlignment: Right
+AccessModifierOffset: -4
+AllowShortBlocksOnASingleLine: false
+AllowShortFunctionsOnASingleLine: Inline
+AllowShortIfStatementsOnASingleLine: false
+BreakBeforeBraces: Attach
+IncludeBlocks: Regroup
+SortIncludes: CaseSensitive
+KeepEmptyLinesAtTheStartOfBlocks: false
+MaxEmptyLinesToKeep: 1
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index ea8f993..72cc651 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
 # ModuleSpoof — DLL Memory Location Redirection & Honeypot Framework
 
+[![ModuleSpoof CI](https://github.com/adamvalves/ModuleSpoof/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/adamvalves/ModuleSpoof/actions/workflows/ci.yml)
+![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-blue.svg)
+![Language: C++20](https://img.shields.io/badge/Language-C%2B%2B20-orange.svg)
+![Platform: Windows%20x64](https://img.shields.io/badge/Platform-Windows%20x64-0078D6.svg)
+
 `ModuleSpoof` is a proof-of-concept C++ library designed to spoof the in-memory location of a target dynamic link library (`DLL`). By intercepting internal Win32 and Native API calls (`GetModuleHandleW`, `GetModuleHandleExW`, `GetProcAddress`, `GetProcAddressForCaller`, `LoadLibraryExW`), internal execution is transparently redirected to a manually mapped copy of the module residing at a secondary memory region.
 
 Simultaneously, the original PEB-registered module location acts as an active **honeypot** to detect unauthorized memory inspection or unbacked access attempts by external tools.