bibliography.bib

% Thesis References

% Articles

@article{baum_potter_2019,
author = "Baum, Matthew A. and Potter, Philip B. K.",
year = 2019,
title = "Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy is the Age of Social Media",
journal = "Journal of Politics",
volume = 81,
issue = 2,
URL = "https://doi.org/10.1086/702233"
}

@article{williams_2018,
author = "Williams, Laron K.",
year = 2018,
title = "Guns Yield Butter? An Exploration of Defense Spending Preferences",
journal = "Journal of Conflict Resolution",
URL = "https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718785969"
}

@article{intawan_2018,
author = "Intawan, Chanita and Nicholson, Stephen P.",
year = 2018,
title = "My Trust in Government is Implicit: Automatic Trust in Government and System Support",
journal = "Journal of Politics",
volume = 80,
issue = 2,
pages = "601-614",
URL = "https://doi.org/10.1086/694785"
}

@report{gallup_2018,
author = "Gallup",
year = 2018,
title = "Confidence in Institutions",
URL = "https://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx"
}

@report{eurobarometer_2018,
author = "European Commission",
year = 2018,
title = "Standard Eurobarometer 89",
URL = "http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2180"
}

@article{burbach_2018,
author = "Burbach, David T.",
year = 2018,
title = "Partisan Dimensions of Confidence in the U.S. Military, 1973 - 2016",
journal = "Armed Forces and Society",
month = "January",
day = 11,
URL = "https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0095327X17747205"
}

@article{golby_et_al_2018,
author = "Golby, James and Feaver, Peter and Dropp, Kyle",
year = 2018,
title = "Elite Military Cues and Public Opinion About the Use of Military Force",
journal = "Armed Forces and Society",
volume = 44,
issue = 1,
pages = "44 - 71"
}

@article{predictive_modeling,
author = "Cranmer, Skyler J. and Desmarais, Bruce A.",
year = 2017,
title = "What Can We Learn from Predictive Modeling?",
journal = "Political Analysis",
volume = 25,
pages = "145-166"
}

@article{random_forests,
author = "Muchlinski, David and Siroky, David and He, Jingrui and Kocher, Matthew",
year = 2016,
title = "Comparing Random Forest with Logistic Regression for Predicting Class-Imbalanced Civil War Onset Data",
journal = "Political Analysis",
volume = 24,
pages = "87 - 103"
}

@article{seven_sins,
author = "Schrodt, Philip A",
year = 2014,
title = "Seven Deadly Sins of Contemporary Quantitative Political Analysis",
journal = "Journal of Peace Research",
volume = 51,
issue = 2,
pages = "287-300"
}

@article{cfr_spending_2014,
author = "Walker, Dinah",
year = 2014,
title = "Trends in U.S. Military Spending",
journal = "Council on Foreign Relations",
URL = "https://www.cfr.org/report/trends-us-military-spending"
}

@article{downes_2012,
author = "Downes, Alexander B. and Sechser, Todd S.",
year = "2012",
title = "The Illusions of Democratic Credibility",
journal = "International Organization",
volume = 66,
issue = 3,
pages = "457 - 489"
}

@article{choi_2011,
author = "Choi, Seung-Whan",
title = "Re-Evaluating Capitalist and Democratic Peace Models",
journal = "International Studies Quarterly",
volume = 55,
issue = 3,
pages = "759 - 769",
year = "2011"
}

@article{althaus_coe_2011,
author = "Althaus, Scott L. and Coe, Kevin",
year = 2011,
title = "Priming Patriots: Social Identity Processes and the Dynamics of Public Support for War",
journal = "Public Opinion Quarterly",
volume = 75,
issue = 1,
pages = "65 - 88"
}

@article{snyder_et_al_2009,
author = "Snyder, Jack and Shapiro, Robert Y. and Block-Elkon, Yaeli",
year = 2009,
title = "Free Hand Abroad, Divide and Rule at Home",
journal = "World Politics",
volume = 61,
issue = 1,
pages = "155 - 187"
}

@article{interaction,
author = "Brambor, Thomas and Clark, William Roberts and Golder, Matt",
year = 2006,
title = "Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Emperical Analyses",
journal = "Political Analysis",
volume = 14,
issue = 1,
pages = "63-82"
}

@article{eichenberg_2005,
author = "Eichenberg, Richard C.",
year = 2005,
title = "Victory Has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force, 1981 - 2005",
journal = "International Security",
volume = 30,
issue = 1,
pages = "140 - 177"
}

@article{palmer_et_al_2004,
author = "Palmer, Glenn and London, Tamar R. and Regan, Patrick M.",
year = 2004,
title = "What's Stopping You? The Sources of Political Constraints on International Conflict Behavior in Parliamentary Democracies",
journal = "International Interactions",
volume = 30,
issue = 1,
pages = "1 - 24"
}

@article{baum_2004,
author = "Baum, Matthew A.",
year = 2004,
title = "How Public Opinion Constrains the Use of Force: The Case of Operation Restore Hope",
journal = "Presidential Studies Quarterly",
volume = 34,
issue = 2,
pages = "187 - 226"
}

@article{leblang_chan_2003,
author = "Leblang, David and Chan, Steve",
year = 2003,
title = "Explaining Wars Fought by Established Democracies: Do Institutional Constraints Matter?",
journal = "Political Research Quarterly",
volume = 56,
issue = 4,
pages = "385 - 400"
}

@article{press_mil,
author = "Fan, David P. and Wyatt, Robert O. and Keltner, Kathy",
title = "The Suicidal Messenger: How Press Reporting Affects Public Confidence in the Press, the Military, and Organized Religion",
year = 2001,
journal = "Communication Research",
volume = 28, 
issue = 6,
pages = "826 - 852"
}

@article{bbs_1999,
author = "Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Morrow, James D. and Siverson, Randolph M. and Smith, Alistar",
title = "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace",
journal = "American Political Science Review",
volume = 93,
issue = 4,
pages = "791 - 807",
year = "1999"
}

@article{aldrich_1989,
author = "Aldrich, John H. and Sullivan, John L. and Borgida, Eugene",
year = "1989",
title = {Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates "Waltz Before a Blind Audience?"},
journal = "American Political Science Review",
volume = 83,
issue = 1,
pages = "123 - 141"
}

@article{almond_1950,
  title={The American people and foreign policy.},
  author={Almond, Gabriel Abraham},
  year={1950},
  publisher={Harcourt, Brace}
}

Experiment which surveys Israeli polititions and Israel/American publics about the use of military force. The two
 mechanisms explored are incentivizing incumbents and shaping who gets elected. Policymakers are more likely to support
 the use of force if the public is in favor. Among Members of the Knesset (MKs), willingness to conduct a strike in the 
 experiment was 16 perent higher when their was public approval. It's not statistically significant, but mostly because 
 it's generally impossible to get a large enough sample of parlamentary members. 61 percent of MKs saw very or extremely
 likely potential political effects from waging an unpopular war and 53 percent saw the same for avoiding a popular war.
 In testing the selection mechanism, showing contravening foreign policy was shown to lower support by 20 percent in 
 the Israeli public, about the same as religion and more than economic policy. In America, the penalty was about the
 same for foreign policy, economic policy, and religion
@report{tomz_et_al_2018,
author = "Tomz, Michael and Weeks, Jessica and Yarhi-Milo, Keren",
year = 2018,
month = 6,
day = 6,
title = "Public Opinion and Decisions about Military Force in Democracies",
type = "Working Paper",
URL = "https://web.stanford.edu/~tomz/working/TWY-PublicOpinion-2018-06-06.pdf"
}

Using an experiment, the authors demonstrate that cues from social peers are "at least as strong as those from political
 elites, and in some cases, stronger" (544). If public opinion is really a top down process, then that undermines the 
 audience costs model of IR theory, so the authors posit a more bottom-up theory. The authors have three reasons they
 believe scholar should consider "mesofoundations and group context" (546): groups are an important source of
 information, groups are important source of social influence, and people behave differently in groups than as
 individuals. The five experiments essentially confirm the importance of ones placement along the military assertiveness
 and internationalism scales from Hermann et all (1999). Group social cues are consistently more important than elite
 or partisan cues. MIlitary assertiveness doesn't affect an IPE experiment, interestingly. Concludes by saying that 
 "future work in public opinion toward foreign policy should therefore explore the broader group contexts in which
 individuals are embedded" (555).
@article{kertzer_zeitzoff_2017,
author = "Kertzer, Joshua D. and Zeitzoff, Thomas",
year = 2017,
title = "A Bottom-Up Theory of Public Opinion About Foreign Policy",
journal = "American Journal of Political Science",
volume = 61,
issue = 3,
pages = "543 - 558"
}

Provides an overview of research on "democracy as an influence on the interstate use of force through the constraining
 effects of domestic public opinion." (1926). Sees the research as coming out of the democratic peace literature of the
 1980s, rather than the "paradigmatic" models of realism v. liberalism v. constructivism that came earlier. Provides a 
 brief overview of the normative v. structurel (institutional) arguements in democratic peace. A structural constraint
 is the audience cost arguement of Fearon, though it is more recently sometimes referred to as the "competenece costs."
 Selectorate theory (BBS and co.) is important and states taht all leaders seek to retain power by satisfying
 constituents. Selectorate theory suggested that policy success should drive public responses and therefore brought
 literature on public opinion and foreign policy into conversation with structural theories. One key factor is that 
 success or perceived success is important (see Gelpi et al, 2005 and Eichenberg 2005). Framing effects and elite cue
 theories somewhat (i.e. Berinsky) challenged the "rational public" model. Baum and Groeling's (2010) "reality asserts
 itself" writings demonstrate that elites only have initial informational advantages. For foreign policy to be important
 in elections, an opposition has to assert a contrarian viewpoint. Some research shows that even if the public doesn't
 hold a ton of facts about foreign policy, their opinions respond to facts. After talking about War and Democratic
 Restraint, Gelpi talks about remaining gaps, mostly with emperial studies on democratic norm effects and the "direct
 causal impact of democracy on foreign policy" (1940)
@article{gelpi_2017,
author = "Gelpi, Christopher",
year = 2017,
title = "Democracies in Conflict: The Role of Public Opinion, Political Parties, and the Press in Shaping Security Policy",
journal = "Journal of Conflict Resolution",
volume = 61,
issue = 9,
pages = "1925 - 1949"
}

Using experiments embedded into U.S. and U.K. public opinion polls, Tomz and Weeks find that democratic publics are 
 more adverse to the use of force against other democracies. They find that shared democracy pacifies the public by 
 "changing perceptiosn of threat and morality." The note a higher "baseline level of militarism" in the U.S. than in the
 the U.K. Joint "democracy matterned not by lowering the expected probability of building nuclear weapons, but by 
 changign perceptions about how the country would use them." No support for the democracies are effective fighters
 so people don't want to go to war with them hypothesis. More engaged segements of the populations were found to be more
 affected by lowering support for war against democracies. 
@article{tomz_weeks_2013,
author = "Tomz, Michael and Weeks, Jessica",
year = 2013,
title = "Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace",
journal = "American Political Science Review",
volume = 107,
issue = 4,
pages = "849 - 865"
}

Is a survey review of research about how public opinion affects policy and how that came to be a primary research
 topic. Lots of research shows that responsiveness to opinion is greater for domestic policy over foreign policy. There
 is evidence of congressional and state-level responsiveness to public opinion. Research in the 80s showed over 60
 percent congruance from public opinion to policy outcomes, which dropped into the 50s in the 1990s (991-992). There is
 literaturing saying that the Supreme Court decisionmaking appears to be in line with public opinion. The conclusion
 is that there is a debate that "policy responsiveness to the public as large has decreased: Partisan conflict has 
 become more polarized, and presidents and other political leaders have used polling to determine how best to lead,
 persuade, and manipulate public opinion, not respond to it" (999)
@article{shapiro_2011,
author = "Shapiro, Robert Y.",
year = 2011,
title = "Public Opinion and American Democracy",
journal = "Public Opinion Quarterly",
volume = 75,
issue = 5,
pages = "982 - 1017"
}

Compares unemployment data to trust in public institutions and finds high correlation in the U.S. and cross nationally.
 The link is strongest in developed countries.
@article{institutions_business_cycle,
author = "Stevenson, Betsey and Wolfers, Justin",
year = 2011,
title = "Trust in Public Institutions over the Business Cycle",
journal = "American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings",
volume = 101,
issue = 3,
pages = "281 - 287"
}

Shows how using t, t-sq, and t-cubed variables is a better method than adding time dummy variables or using cubic
 splines when conducting hazard/survival analysis.
@article{time_dependence,
author = "Carter, David B. and Signorino, Curtis S.",
title = "Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data",
year = 2010,
journal = "Political Analysis",
volume = 18,
pages = "271 - 292"
}

Finds that elite rhetoric is influential only immediately after a war begins, when the "rally 'round the flat" effect is
 dominante. However, after a certain point, the "reality" on the ground influences the public's opinion about a war
 effort. "This suggests that the 'audience' is not necessarily the passive rubber stamp frequently assumed by audience
 cost theories." (475). However, in the much longer term, there isn't much "elasticity of realty" and opinions become
 generally codified and less likely to be influenced by new facts.
@article{baum_groeling_2010,
author = "Baum, Matthew A. and Groeling, Tim",
year = 2010,
title = "Reality Asserts Itself: Public Opinion on Iraq and the Elasticity of Reality",
journal = "International Organization",
volume = 64,
issue = 3,
pages = "443 - 479"
}

Tests the thesis of Reiter and Stam's book that democracies are more likely to win wars. Finds that their methodology 
 for not including war joiners and draws gave false statistical results. Downes then utilizes process tracing of
 Johnson's decision to enter the Vietnam war to show that most members of the administration did not actually think
 there would be victory. Downes shows that domestic politics affected the decision for war and that Johnson feared
 political punishment for withdrawing and not being able to institute the Great Society. Also, Downes conclusion notes
 how democratic leaderships have often downplayed the cost of war to gain support for a long war (e.g. the 18-year
 occupation of Lebanon by Israel). I love this article.
@article{downes_2009,
author = "Downes, Alexander B.",
year = 2009,
title = "How Smart and Tough Are Democracies?",
journal = "International Security",
volume = 33,
issue = 4,
pages = "9 - 51"
}

Uses an "elite cue" theory stating that "the nature of conflict among political elites concerning the salience and 
 meaning of those events determines if the public will rally to war" (975). "When elites come to a common interpretation
 of a political reality, the public gives them great latitude to wage war" (975). "The mass public is rational only to
 the extent that prominent political actors provide a rational lead" (976). Finds from a survey about Iraq that 
 information wasn't important and that even in WW2, battlefield events alone were not enough to explain public opinion
 during the war. Essentilly is dissuaded by "event-response theories" and thinks that unified "elite cues" are all that
 mattered.
@article{berinsky_2007,
author = "Berinsky, Adam",
year = 2007,
title = "Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict",
journal = "The Journal of Politics",
volume = 69,
issue = 4,
pages = "975 - 997"
}

An overview of framing theory. Early studies talked about how individuals endorsed democratic values, but failed to 
 defend their application. The public may have held fragmentary and conflicting attitudes. Framing theory posits that 
 one's frame can be influenced by politicians trying to get voters to think of an issues along a certain line. People
 draw their opinions from the set of available beliefs stored in memory. "Framing can work...by making new beliefs
 available about an issue, making certain available beliefs accessible, or making beliefs applicable or "strong" in 
 people's evaluations." (111) Strong frames can be built around "exaggerations and outright lies" (111) and should not
 be confused with "intellectually or morally superior arguements" (111). "Framing effects are a liability only if 
 individuals never develop a basis for discriminating among frames and remain constantly vulnerable to changing
 representations of issues" (120). "Stability of opinions per se - divorced from the process by which judgments are
 formed and maintained - is therefore a misguided criterion for evaluating the quality of political evaluation." (120).
 "Hence, both excessive instability and excessive stability of public opinion can be liabilities in a democracy" (120)
@article{framing_theory,
author = "Chong, Dennis and Druckman, James N.",
year = 2007,
title = "Framing Theory",
journal = "Annual Review of Political Science",
volume = 1,
pages = "103 - 126"
}

Capitalism makes peace, not democracies. Posits more of a liberal peace, rather than a democratic peace.
@article{capitalist_peace,
author = "Gartzke, Erik",
title = "The Capitalist Peace",
journal = "American Journal of Political Science",
volume = 51,
issue = 1,
pages = "166 - 191",
year = "2007"
}

The authors argue that the U.S. public "makes reasoned and reasonable judgements" and casualties and support for the war
 in Iraq (8). The belive that the decline in support came from "a perceived lack of measureable process toward "sucess"
 that eroded the public's hopes that the war may eventually be won" (9). The authors test Jentleson's arguement that the
 "pretty prudent" public bases casualty tolerance on the policy objected, Larson's arguement that public tolerance 
 follows domestic elite tolerance and Kull's arguement that multilateral support boosts domestic support. The authors
 note the difficulty of relying on aggregate data. From polling data they conducted they find that "expectations about
 victory have a greater impact on casualty tolerance when respondents are skeptical about the justification of the war
 than their views about the rightness of the war have when they are skeptical about victory" (32). Thinking the war was
 the right wing has a positive interaction coefficient with perceptions of success. Good line, "public expectations of 
 success are central in determining public support for paying the human costs of war" (40). The public appears "to be
 engaging in simple but clear calculations about the expected value of continuing to engage in armed conflict" (44).
@article{gelpi_et_al_2006,
author = "Gelpi, Christopher and Feaver, Peter D. and Reifler, Jason",
year = 2006,
title = "Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq",
journal = "International Security",
volume = 30,
issue = 3,
pages = "7 - 46"
}

Wide ranging overview of the link between foreign policy and U.S. electoral politics. Covers a lot of issues, so 
 probably need to look at the article for key points.
@article{review_fp_and_elections,
author = "Aldrich, John H. and Gelpi, Christopher and Feaver, Peter and Reifler, Jason and Sharp, Kristin Thompson",
year = 2006,
title = "Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection",
journal = "Annual Review of Political Science",
volume = 9,
pages = "477 - 502"
}

Identifies six main causal mechanisms from the democratic peace literature and itemizes problems with each of them. From
 the normative logic, externalized trust and respect leads to peace, but Rosato uses imperialization wars and covert
 Cold War interventions by America against democracies as evidence against this logic. The institutional logics lead
 from accountability to public constraint, group constraint, slow mobilization, no suprise attack and information that
 leads to peace. Public constrain is undermined by the the small subsets of populations that fight wars, nationalism, 
 and elite cues overwhelming public opinion. Group constraint is undermined by the fact that antiwar groups rarely have
 power and that there is also evidence of group restraint in autocracies. Slow mobilization is undermined by how often
 American presidennts have "circumvented or ignored checks and balances, thereby speeding up the war decision process"
 (597). The surprise attack arguement is poor because defenders are "poor at evaluating information" (598) regardlesss
 of if they're democracies or autocracies. The information arguement is undermined by the fact that democratic processes
 can reveal too much information that is hard to interpret and because "open domestic political competition does not
 ensure that states will reveal their private information" (598). Rosato finishes by saying "that the democratic peace
 is in fact an imperial peace based on American power" (599) since it's essentially a post-WW2.
@article{rosato_2003,
author = "Rosato, Sebastian",
title = "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory",
journal = "American Political Science Review",
volume = 97,
issue = 4,
pages = "585 - 602",
year = "2003"
}

Highly-cited article that examines the varied democracy datasets. Many datasets lack measure for participation, which is
 a particularly problem with the Polity dataset. Measurement error in some aspects is not always accounted for (e.g. 
 increased perceived corruption may indicate a freer press). The selection of measurement level (e.g. nominal, ordinal)
 and lack of intercoder reliability is a problem. The aggregate top-level measures are criticized because there is not an
 explicit validity to the measures.
@article{@conceptualizing_democracy,
author = "Munck, Gerardo L. and Verkuilen, Jay",
year = 2002,
title = "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indicies",
journal = "Comparative Political Studies",
volume = 35, 
issue = 1,
pages = "5 - 34"
}

Confirms the rational public arguement of Shapiro and Page as applying to France, Italy, and Germany. However,
 there were greater fluxuations in opinion immediatley after WW2 when the rules of the international system were
 less clear. Also, some events (first man in orbit in 1963, the Korean War) didn't affect public opinion in expected
 ways
@article{rational_public_comparitive,
author = "Isernia, Pierangelo and Juhasz, Zoltan and Rattinger, Hans",
year = 2002, 
title = "Foreign Policy and the Rational Public in Comparitive Perspective",
journal = "Journal of Conflict Resolution",
volume = 46,
issue = 2,
pages = "201 - 224"
}



Based on experiments in public polls, the authors find that US public views about the use of force are measured by 
 placement on two-axis assertiveness-isolationist/internationalist perspective rather than a liberal/conservative
 measure. Situational cues are very important with the perception of US interests being involved and the persons's image
 of the adversary beint important. Being more politically knowledgable means a respondent is more likely to respond to
 situational factors. Also important was whether the armed conflict involved a civil war or cross-border attack. The 
 interaction between liberal/conservatives values was found to only be significant for interacting wiht the perception
 or lack thereof of US interests.
@article{tetlock_et_al_1999,
author = "Herrmann, Richard K. and Tetlock, Philip E. and Visser, Penny S.",
year = 1999,
title = "Mass Public Decisions to go to War: A Cognitive-Interactionist Framework",
journal = "American Political Science Review",
volume = 93,
issue = 3,
pages = "553 - 573"
}

Schultz looks at the reactions by other countries to democracies in the international system regarding war. Schultz 
 tests BBS et al's arguement that institutional constraints make war make benefits to democratic leaders lower and 
 Fearon's arguement that democracies are better at signalling their true intentions. Neither of these two arguements are
 dependent on the other state, unlik, say, a moralistic dyadic democractic peace arguement. Schultz finds evidence that
 targets of militarized action are less likely to respond militarily if the initator is a democracy, which is consistent
 with the informational perspective. There isn't much support found for the institutional constrains perspective
@article{schultz_1999,
author = "Schultz, Kenneth A.",
year = 1999,
title = "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War",
journal = "International Organization",
volume = 53,
issue = 2,
pages = "233 - 266"
}


Somewhat refutes Waltz's formation that states are affected by the system and argues that the subject of systemic
 theories is and shoud be states' foreign policies and consequences. A domestic-political IR theory is "one in which at
 least one state is represented as nonunitary, and at least one such state pursues a suboptimal foreign policy due,
 somehow, to the interaction of the actors represented within the state" (299). Fearon emphasizes that relative power
 is not the only measure by which to explain foreign policy choices. Fearon cites examples where "organizational biases
 of professional militaries lead them to advocate offensive military doctrines, which in turn influence civilian leaders
 to choose foreign policies more likely to result in war" (302).
@article{fearon_1998,
author = "Fearon, James",
year = 1998,
title = "Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations",
journal = "American Review of Political Science",
pages = "289 - 313"
}

Theoretical premise that democraicies are less likely to back down from threats and bluffs, which makes it easier for
 democracies to signal their true intentions than autocracies. The "audience costs" arguement says that "domestic
 audiences may provide the strongest incentives for leaders to guard their states' "international" reputations" (581).
 Democratic leaders tend to face more powerful domestic audiendes and are more reluctant to initiate limited probes in
 foreign policy.
@article{fearon_1994,
author = "Fearon, James",
title = "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes",
journal = "American Political Science Review",
volume = 88,
issue = 3,
pages = "577-592",
year = "1994"
}

Tests normative and structural reasons for why democracies don't fight each other, the "democratic peace." The normative
 arguement is that democratic norms allow for better negotions between states before war. Sturctural models talk about
 constraints on the executive in the constitution and legal system; presidential majoritarian democracies are less 
 constrained. The OLS finds joint democracies are less MID-prone, bt the coefficient is really low and that's not really
 mentioned in the text. They also find that institutional constrains do prevent escalation to war, but they do not
 prevent states from entering lower-level disputes. The authors comes down slightly on the normative arguement.
@article{maoz_russet_1993,
author = "Maoz, Zeev and Russet, Bruce",
title = "Normative and Structure Cause of Democratic Peace, 1946 - 1986",
journal = "American Political Science Review",
volume = 87,
issue = 3,
pages = "624 - 638",
year = "1993"
}

The author argues that during the 1980s, the main issue for gaining public support was the "principal policy objective"
 of an intervention. The use of force as a "foreign policy restraint" (i.e. an aggressive actor against the United 
 States) garnered greater support than the use of force for "internal political change" (i.e. supporting an ally or
 seeking the overthrow of a hostile power). Halo effects were found for successful interventions and by removing these
 there was a much higher approval for the cases of foreign policy restraint ("Libya: antiterrorism," "Persian Gulf 
 Reflagging," "Lebanon" (coded as mixed), "Afghanistan" (coded as mixed), and "Nicaragua: military exercises) than for
 internal political change ("Panama (pre-invasion)," "El Salvador," "Libya: get Qaddafi," and "Nicaragua: overthrow
 Sandinistas")
@article{jentleson_1992,
author = "Jentleson, Bruce W.",
year = 1992,
title = "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force",
journal = "International Studies Quarterly",
volume = 36,
pages = "49 - 74"
}

Starts by giving an overview of the realist/liberal paradigm in which realists are skeptical of public opinion and 
 liberals are more inclusive. The Almond-Lippmann consensus is that "the common man" is too concerned with daily life
 to be concerned with foreign policy. The primary consequences are that public opinion is volitile, lacks structure and 
 coherence, and has limited impact onthe conduct of foreign policy. Shapiro/Page and then Jentleson essentially prove
 the volitility arguement is garbage. Studies found more consistency after the Johnson-Goldwater election. In addition,
 the structure is more complicated than liberal-conservative, but requires two axes of support-opposition to militant
 internationalism and cooperative internationalism. "Because voters are perceived as punishing incumbent candidates or
 parties for foreign policy failuires...or rewarding them for successes...,decisions by foreign policy leaders may be
 made in anticipation of public reactions and the probabilities of success or failure (452)." The support for the public
 effect on foreign policy is more tenuous. Holsti concludes that case studies using archival work, cross-national
 research, development of standard questions, and non-Cold War results are needed.
@article{holsti_1992,
author = "Holsti, Ole R.",
year = 1992,
title = "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus",
journal = "International Studies Quarterly",
volume = 36,
pages = "439 - 466"
}

Surveys the US, France, Germany, and Japan to "show that differences in political institutions, policy networks, and
 societal structures account for different foreign policy outcomes when the impact of the international environment is
 controlled for and public attitudes follow similar patterns across countries." (480). Argues for distinguishing between
 the "mass public opinion," "attentive public," and "issue publics" (482). "Domestic structures and coalition-building
 processes" are also required to understand outcomes (484). Risse-Kappen constrasts the political systems degree of
 centralization/decentralization, societies polarization and strength of social organization, and if the policy network 
 is society, state, or inbetween (corporatist) (486 and 492, table 1). The pattern of matching public opinion and policy
 ocurred in the US/German, less so in Japan, and not in France. "This study suggests, however, that the indirect effects
 of public opinion are far more important. To the extent that the emperical material was available, it could be shown
 that the main role of the public in liberal democracies is to influence the coalition-building processes among elite
 groups" (510)
@article{rissekappen_1991,
author = "Risse-Kappen, Thomas",
year = 1991,
title = "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies",
journal = "World Politics",
volume = 43,
issue = "July",
pages = "479 - 512"
}

Looks at polling data from World War II through the Reagan administration and concludes that the U.S. public rarely
 changed their opinions about foreign policy issues without good cause. The arguement against mass public rationality
 is that the public was fickle and uninformed. This article essentially contradicts the Almond-Lippmann consensus by 
 demonstrating that public opinion was relatively stable and tended to change in response to events in foreign affairs.
@article{shapiro_page_1988,
author = "Shapiro, Robert Y. and Page, Benjamin I.",
year = 1988,
title = "Foreign Policy and the Rational Public",
journal = "Journal of Conflict Resolution",
volume = 32,
issue = 2,
pages = "211 - 247"
}

Most cited finding is that support for the two wars was significantly correlated with the log of casualties in the wars.
 Also finds that the two wars followed similar trajectories in support and that the Korean war was probably less 
 popular than Vietnam (though this was written in 1971). Finally, posits a few structure changes in the "intellectual
 left" that led to the wider visibility of unpopularity of Vietnam that probably couldn't be cited in the 21st century.
@article{mueller_1971,
author = "Mueller, John E.",
year = 1971,
title = "Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam",
journal = "Annual Political Science Review",
volume = 65, 
issue = 2,
pages = "358 - 375"
}

Posits that political parties exist solely for gaining votes and power. Because of imperfect information, democracy
 becomes representative government and lobbying is a perfectly rational response in democracies. Parties invent
 ideologies in an effort to attract votes. The marginal cost of acquiring information for politicians and voters leads
 to a rational ignorance about most issues. Therefore, government priorities producers over consumers because
 all actors are lobbyists for their own one or two issues. 
@article{downs_1957,
author = "Downs, Anthony",
year = 1957,
title = "An Economic Theory of Political Action in Democracy",
journal = "Journal of Political Economy",
volume = 65,
issue = 2,
pages = "135 - 150"
}

% Books

@book{baum_potter_2015,
  author = {Baum, Matthew A. and Potter, Philip B. K.}, 
  title = {War and Democratic Constraint: How the Public Influences Foreign Policy},
  publisher = {Princeton University Press},
  year = 2015,
  address = {Princeton}
}

% Datasets

@article{electoral_systems,
author = "Nils-Christian, Bormann and Golder, Matt",
year = 2013,
title = "Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946-2011",
journal = "Electoral Studies",
volume = 32,
pages = "360 - 369"
}

@article{mid_4,
author = "Palmer, Glenn and D'Orazio, Vito and Kenwick, Michael and Lane, Matthew",
year = 2015,
title = "The Mid4 Dataset, 2002-2010: Procedures, Coding Rules and Description",
journal = "Conflict Management and Peace Science",
volume = 32,
pages = "222 - 242",
URL = "http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/MIDs"
}

@article{mid_dyad_3,
author = "Maoz, Zeev and Johnson, Paul L. and Kaplan, Jasper and Ogunkoya, Fiona and Shreve, Aaron",
title = "The Dyadic Militarized International Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 3.0: Logic, Characteristics, and Comparison to Alternative Datasets.",
journal = "Journal of Conflict Resolution",
year = "2018",
URL = "https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022002718784158"
}

@article{icb_data,
author = "Brecher, Michael and Wilkenfeld, Jonathan and Beardsley, Kyle and James, Patrick and Quinn, David",
title = "International Crisis Behavior Codebook, Version 12",
year = "2017",
URL = "http://sites.duke.edu/icbdata/data-collections/"
}

@article{conscription,
author = "Toronto, Nathan W.",
year = 2014,
title = "Military Recruitment Data Set, version 2014",
URL = "http://www.nathantoronto.com/academic­research"}

@article{imi_data,
author = "Pickering, Jeffery and Kisangani, Emizet F.",
title = "The International Military Intervention Dataset: An Updated Resource for Conflict Scholars", 
journal = "Journal of Peace Research",
volume = 46,
issue = 4,
year = "2009",
pages = "589-599"
}

@article{crisis_behavior,
author = "Brecher, Michael",
year = "1977",
title = "Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behavior: A Preliminary Report",
journal = "International Studies Quarterly",
volume = 21,
issue = 1,
pages = "39-74"
}

@article{polityIV,
author = "Marshall, Monty and Gurr, Ted Robert and Jaggers, Keith",
year = "2018",
title = "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800 - 2017 Codebook",
URL = "http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2017.pdf"
}

@misc{free_press,
organization = "Freedom House",
year = 2017,
URL = "https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press",
}

@manual{wvs6,
  title        = {World Values Survey: Round Six - Country-Pooled Datafile},
  author       = {Inglehart, R. and Haerpfer, C. and Moreno, A. and Welzel, C. and Kizilova, K. and Diez-Medrano, J. and Lagos, M. and Norris, P. and Ponarin, E. and Puranen, B and others}, 
  organization = {JD Systems Institute},
  address      = {Madrid},
  year         = 2014,
  note         = {An optional note},
URL = "www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp"
}

@misc{enpp,
title = "Election Indicies",
year = 2018,
author = "Gallagher, Michael",
URL = "https://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/people/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf"
}

%News Sources

Article about Spain peacekeeping following Iraq pullout
@article{spain_iraq_peacekeeping,
date = "2004-05-07",
journal = "The New York Times",
title = "Spanish Premier Says Troops Will Not Return to Iraq",
URL = "https://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/07/world/spanish-premier-says-troops-will-not-return-to-iraq.html",
urldate = "2019-04-19"
}

CNN article about Spain's Iraq pullout
@article{spain_iraq_pullout,
date = "2004-04-18",
journal = "BBC News",
title = "Spain PM Orders Iraq Troops Home",
URL =  "http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3637523.stm",
urldate = "2019-04-19"
}

CNN article about Spain's Iraq mission
@article{spain_iraq_begin,
date = "2003-03-18",
journal = "CNN",
title = "Spain: No Combat Role in Iraq War",
URL = "http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/18/sprj.irq.spain/",
urldate = "2019-04-19"
}
%Eurobarometer Data

@manual{euro_48,
author = "Melich, Anna",
year = 2002,
title = "Eurobarometer 48.0: Holiday Travel, October-November 1997",
organization = "Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]",
address = "Ann Arbor, MI",
URL = "https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR02353.v1"
}

@manual{euro_51,
author = "Melich, Anna",
year = 2007,
title = "Eurobarometer 51.0: The Elderly and Domestic Violence, March-May 1999",
organization = "Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]",
address = "Ann Arbor, MI",
URL = "https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR02864.v3"
}

@manual{euro_54_1,
author = "Hartung, Harald",
year = 2008,
title = "Eurobarometer 54.1: Building Europe and the European Union, The European Parliament, Public Safety, and Defense Policy, November-December 2000",
organization = "Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]",
address = "Ann Arbor, MI",
URL = "https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03209.v4"
}

@manual{euro_55_1,
author = "Christensen, Thomas",
year = 2010,
title = "Eurobarometer 55.1: Globalization and Humanitarian Aid, April-May 2001",
organization = "Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]",
address = "Ann Arbor, MI",
URL = "https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03361.v3"
}

@manual{euro_56_2,
author = "Christensen, Thomas",
year = 2006,
title = "Eurobarometer 56.2: Radioactive Waste, Demographic Issues, the Euro, and European Union Enlargement, October-November 2001",
organization = "Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]",
address = "Ann Arbor, MI",
URL = "https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03476.v3"
}

@manual{euro_57_1,
author = "Christensen, Thomas",
year = 2007,
title = "Eurobarometer 57.1: European Union Enlargement, the European Parliament, and the Euro, March-May 2002",
organization = "Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]",
address = "Ann Arbor, MI",
URL = "https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03521.v2"
}

@manual{euro_59_1,
author = "Christensen, Thomas",
year = 2010,
title = "Eurobarometer 59.1: The Euro and Parental Leave, March-April 2003",
organization = "Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]",
address = "Ann Arbor, MI",
URL = "https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03930.v3"
}

@manual{euro_60_1,
author = "Papacostas, Antonis",
year = 2010,
title = "Eurobarometer 60.1: Citizenship and Sense of Belonging, Fraud, and the European Parliament, October-November 2003",
organization = "Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]",
address = "Ann Arbor, MI",
URL = "https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03991.v3"
}

@manual{euro_61_0,
author = "Papacostas, Antonis",
year = 2010,
title = "Eurobarometer 61.0: The European Union, Globalization, and the European Parliament (30 Years of Eurobarometer), February-March 2004",
organization = "Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]",
address = "Ann Arbor, MI",
URL = "https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR04116.v2"
}

@manual{euro_62_0,
author = "Papacostas, Antonis",
year = 2010,
title = "Eurobarometer 62.0: Standard European Trend Questions and Sport, October-November 2004",
organization = "Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]",
address = "Ann Arbor, MI",
URL = "https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR04289.v2"
}

@manual{euro_64_2,
author = "Papacostas, Antonis",
year = 2010,
title = "Eurobarometer 64.2: The European Constitution, Globalization, Energy Resources, and Agricultural Policy, October-November 2005",
organization = "Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]",
address = "Ann Arbor, MI",
URL = "https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR04580.v3"
}

@manual{euro_66_1,
author = "Papacostas, Antonis",
year = 2010,
title = "Eurobarometer 66.1: European Values and Societal Issues, Mobile Phone Use, and Farm Animal Welfare, September-October 2006",
organization = "Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]",
address = "Ann Arbor, MI",
URL = "https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR21281.v2"
}

@manual{euro_68_1,
author = "Papacostas, Antonis",
year = 2011,
title = "Eurobarometer 68.1: The European Parliament and Media Usage, September-November 2007",
organization = "Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]",
address = "Ann Arbor, MI",
URL = "https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR23368.v3"
}

@manual{euro_69_2,
author = "Papacostas, Antonis",
year = 2013,
title = "Eurobarometer 69.2: National and European Identity, European Elections, European Values, and Climate Change, March-May 2008",
organization = "Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]",
address = "Ann Arbor, MI",
URL = "https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR25021.v3"
}

@manual{euro_72_4,
author = "European Commission",
year = 2013,
title = "Eurobarometer 72.4: Globalization, Financial and Economic Crisis, Social Change and Values, EU Policies and Decision Making, and Global Challenges, October-November 2009",
organization = "Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor]",
address = "Ann Arbor, MI",
URL = "https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR30461.v1"
}