diff --git a/resource/verify.go b/resource/verify.go
index 9cacf11f..8bc14821 100644
--- a/resource/verify.go
+++ b/resource/verify.go
@@ -26,8 +26,14 @@ import (
 // sender-constrained one way or the other; a bearer token presented
 // with neither a DPoP proof nor a client certificate is rejected.
 type VerifyRequest struct {
-	Method        string
-	URL           *url.URL
+	Method string
+	URL    *url.URL
+
+	// Authorization is the request's one Authorization header. A request
+	// with more than one is malformed (RFC 9110 §5.3: the field isn't a
+	// list): VerifyRequestFromHTTP marks it so for Verify to refuse, and
+	// an adapter filling this field itself refuses it first, rather than
+	// passing one of them on. A proxy in front might act on another.
 	Authorization string
 
 	// DPoPProofs is every "DPoP" header value the request carried, in
@@ -47,6 +53,10 @@ type VerifyRequest struct {
 	// one). An HTTP adapter reads this straight from the connection's
 	// own TLS state; this package never terminates TLS itself.
 	PeerCertificate *x509.Certificate
+
+	// repeatedAuthorization is VerifyRequestFromHTTP's mark of a request
+	// with more than one Authorization header.
+	repeatedAuthorization bool
 }
 
 // AuthorizationContext is what Verify returns for a successfully
@@ -191,6 +201,9 @@ func parseAuthorization(req VerifyRequest) (dpopProof, raw string, usedDPoP bool
 		return "", "", true, newError(ErrorInvalidDPoPProof, 401, "multiple DPoP proofs are not permitted", nil)
 	}
 
+	if req.repeatedAuthorization {
+		return "", "", false, newError(ErrorInvalidRequest, 400, "multiple Authorization headers are not permitted", nil)
+	}
 	if strings.TrimSpace(req.Authorization) == "" {
 		return "", "", false, noCredentials("no Authorization header")
 	}
diff --git a/resource/verify_request_http.go b/resource/verify_request_http.go
index 3c11346c..a37116ac 100644
--- a/resource/verify_request_http.go
+++ b/resource/verify_request_http.go
@@ -8,7 +8,9 @@ import (
 // VerifyRequestFromHTTP builds the VerifyRequest for r, an incoming
 // request to the protected resource whose external URL is target: its
 // method, Authorization header, every DPoP header (DPoPProofsFromHTTP)
-// and TLS client certificate (PeerCertificateFromHTTP). Filling the
+// and TLS client certificate (PeerCertificateFromHTTP). A request with
+// more than one Authorization header is marked for Verify to refuse as
+// invalid_request, as it refuses more than one DPoP header. Filling the
 // struct field by field compiles just as well with a field left out, and
 // then fails only for the clients that need it — a missing
 // PeerCertificate refuses every mTLS-bound token, a missing DPoPProofs
@@ -34,5 +36,7 @@ func VerifyRequestFromHTTP(r *http.Request, target *url.URL) VerifyRequest {
 		Authorization:   r.Header.Get("Authorization"),
 		DPoPProofs:      DPoPProofsFromHTTP(r),
 		PeerCertificate: PeerCertificateFromHTTP(r),
+
+		repeatedAuthorization: len(r.Header.Values("Authorization")) > 1,
 	}
 }
diff --git a/resource/verify_test.go b/resource/verify_test.go
index 08e35ea4..4a5d675a 100644
--- a/resource/verify_test.go
+++ b/resource/verify_test.go
@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ import (
 	"crypto/elliptic"
 	"crypto/rand"
 	"crypto/sha256"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
 	"net/url"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
@@ -572,3 +575,28 @@ func TestErrorAccessorsWithoutCause(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("Error() = %q, want %q", rerr.Error(), "resource: invalid_request: method is required")
 	}
 }
+
+// TestVerifyRefusesRepeatedAuthorization covers a request with two
+// Authorization headers, through VerifyRequestFromHTTP: refused as
+// invalid_request rather than verified on the first, while a proxy in
+// front might have acted on the other.
+func TestVerifyRefusesRepeatedAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newFixture(t)
+	request := func(authorizations ...string) *http.Request {
+		r := httptest.NewRequest("GET", f.target.String(), nil)
+		for _, a := range authorizations {
+			r.Header.Add("Authorization", a)
+		}
+		r.Header.Set("DPoP", f.dpopProof)
+		return r
+	}
+
+	if _, err := f.verifier.Verify(context.Background(), resource.VerifyRequestFromHTTP(request("DPoP "+f.accessToken), f.target)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Verify(one Authorization header) = %v, want nil", err)
+	}
+	_, err := f.verifier.Verify(context.Background(), resource.VerifyRequestFromHTTP(request("DPoP "+f.accessToken, "Bearer other"), f.target))
+	var rerr *resource.Error
+	if !errors.As(err, &rerr) || rerr.Code() != resource.ErrorInvalidRequest || rerr.HTTPStatus() != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Errorf("Verify(two Authorization headers) = %v, want a 400 invalid_request", err)
+	}
+}