LodeDB is a local-first, in-process library: it runs inside your own application, stores its index on local disk, and makes no outbound network calls except a one-time Hugging Face download of embedding-model weights. There is no hosted LodeDB service to attack remotely — the security surface is the library running on your machine.
Please report security issues privately — do not open a public GitHub issue.
- Preferred: open a private advisory via GitHub Security Advisories at https://github.com/Egoist-Machines/LodeDB/security/advisories/new.
- Or email oss@egoistmachines.com with steps to reproduce, the affected version
(
python -c "import lodedb; print(lodedb.__version__)"), and impact.
We aim to acknowledge a report within 5 business days and to share a remediation timeline after triage. Please give us a reasonable window to ship a fix before public disclosure; we're happy to credit reporters who want it.
LodeDB is pre-1.0. Security fixes target the latest released 0.x version only. Pin a
version and watch releases until a stable line is published.
- The bundled dev server (
lodedb serve) is unauthenticated. It binds to loopback by default and may intentionally bind to a private/RFC1918 address for trusted-LAN use, but must not be exposed to public or untrusted networks. The MCP server (lodedb mcp) runs over stdio and inherits the local process boundary. - Original document text is retained by default in a local
.tvtextsidecar. Treat that directory as sensitive, or open the database withstore_text=Falseto keep no text on disk. Seedocs/architecture.mdfor the persistence / payload boundary. - The vendored TurboVec core under
third_party/turbovec/is upstream MIT code. Issues specific to upstream TurboVec are best reported to that project, but feel free to flag anything you find through the channels above and we'll help coordinate.