docs: state sparse kernel production intent

Author: AbrahamGreenman

README.md

@@ -110,11 +110,23 @@ OpenClaw embedded runs now materialize a SparseKernel task lease and transcript
 
 The product name of this repository is **Sparse Kernel**. The implementation crates, binaries, and package names use `sparsekernel` where package ecosystems prefer a compact identifier.
 
+## Production Readiness
+
+Sparse Kernel's production goal is a local multi-agent runtime that can run many durable logical agents on ordinary machines while keeping expensive and sensitive resources bounded, leased, audited, and brokered by trust zone.
+
+Production readiness is an executable gate, not a blanket isolation claim. Use the strict acceptance lane before cutover:
+
+```bash
+pnpm sparsekernel:acceptance --current-platform --run --include-recommended
+```
+
+For OpenClaw deployments, `openclaw runtime acceptance --strict --current-platform --run --include-recommended` checks the same runtime surface alongside the operator's configured session, transcript, tool, browser, sandbox, egress, worker-identity, and plugin subprocess settings.
+
 ## Current Status
 
-V0 proves the foundation: migrations, the runtime ledger, transcript events, embedded-run task leases, artifact primitives, capability checks, audit records, browser/sandbox broker records, a CLI, a daemon, and a TypeScript client.
+V0 now covers the production cutover foundation: migrations, the runtime ledger, transcript events, embedded-run task leases, artifact primitives, capability checks, audit records, browser/sandbox broker records, a CLI, a daemon, a TypeScript client, strict acceptance lanes, brokered CDP browser contexts/actions, egress proxy and firewall-helper planning, worker-identity provisioning plans, and plugin subprocess policy hooks.
 
-It does not yet implement production Playwright browser process pooling, production sandbox backends, host-level egress proxy enforcement, plugin subprocess isolation, or a full OpenClaw runtime rewrite.
+Sparse Kernel still does not claim a universal host security boundary. BrowserContext isolation is session isolation, local/no-isolation sandboxing is accounting only, and host-level egress is as strong as the configured proxy, firewall, sandbox, VM, or operator helper. OpenClaw compatibility paths remain intentionally staged while the strict ledger-primary path, brokered tools, browser brokering, sandbox policy, and plugin subprocess controls harden behind acceptance gates.
 
 ## Development